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Critics of fringe banking—products like payday loans, pawn loans, and rent-toown leases—frequently argue that these products cause borrowers to experience
financial distress. This argument has enormous intuitive appeal: Fringe credit is
very costly, and usually the borrowers who use it are already in a serious financial
bind. Taking on additional debt and paying high prices for it, the reasoning goes,
drive them over the brink.
Surprisingly, however, linking financial distress to fringe banking is extremely
difficult to do. This Article represents the first attempt to uncover the relationship
between fringe banking and financial distress by systematically analyzing the
structure of fringe credit markets and the characteristics of specific fringe credit
transactions. Contrary to the assumptions made by the bulk of the literature, I
argue that the link between fringe banking and financial distress is dubious.
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Because fringe creditors cannot rely on borrowers’ credit scores to predict whether
they will be repaid, creditors structure fringe credit products to virtually guarantee
repayment. Because repayment is guaranteed by the structure of the transaction, it
is nearly impossible for borrowers to take on unmanageable debt loads.
Yet, a significant amount of regulatory intervention into fringe banking markets
is premised upon the relationship between fringe banking and financial distress.
Policy makers lump fringe credit together with other forms of credit that do cause
financial distress, resulting in misguided and overly broad policies. The Article
concludes by exploring the policy implications of determining that fringe banking
products do not cause distress.
INTRODUCTION
A common theoretical justification for regulating consumer credit contracts is
that borrowing leads consumers to financial distress. Financial distress in turn
results in a variety of welfare costs for the borrowers, their families, and the
community. The devastation to the national and world economies because of the
subprime mortgage crisis is a powerful example of the externalities created through
private consumer credit contracts.
When academics and policy makers consider regulating the fringe economy—
payday lenders, pawnshops, rent-to-own stores, and the like—we might expect
them to turn to financial distress to justify regulation.1 Concerns about financial
distress are particularly salient in the fringe economy because consumers of fringe
credit are, by very definition, on the financial fringe. They are either poor or lack
good credit, and they are unable or unwilling to use mainstream banking services.2
Additionally, the terms of credit contracts in the fringe economy are typically very
harsh—the costs are high and the consequences of default are severe, causing some
to say fringe credit creates a debt trap.3 Given these factors, it seems plain that
fringe banking leads the consumers who use it to experience financial distress.
President Obama’s push to create a Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
confirms the suspicion that policy makers will turn to financial distress to regulate
the fringe economy. When justifying the Bureau’s control over fringe credit
providers, President Obama invoked financial distress as a harm that new
regulations could solve.4 President Obama’s focus on financial distress is far from

1. See, e.g., Ronald H. Silverman, Toward Curing Predatory Lending, 122 BANKING
L.J. 483, 486 (2005) (“This financial system at the fringe includes pawnshops, check cashing
outlets, rent-to-own stores, tax refund-anticipation lenders, the makers of car title pawns,
cash leasing operations and other second-tier credit providers as well.”).
2. Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855, 857
(2007).
3. Errol Louis, Editorial, How to Spear Credit Sharks, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 11,
2009, at 39 (“[Twelve] million borrowers have payday loans, which charge interest rates as
high as 400%—a permanent debt trap for people most in need of a fair deal.”).
4. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Consumer Financial
Protection (Oct. 9, 2009) [hereinafter Remarks, Consumer Financial Protection], available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-ConsumerFinancial-Protection (linking payday lending to wide-scale financial distress) (“[A]buses like
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extraordinary. In the vast majority of the literature on consumer credit, authors
assume or argue that fringe banking products cause financial distress.5
This Article is the first sustained examination of whether there is a link between
fringe banking products and financial distress. In contrast to the assumptions and
arguments in most of the literature, I argue that the link between existing fringe
banking and financial distress is questionable. Using examples of current fringe
financial products, I demonstrate that these products share a series of characteristics
that make it very unlikely they cause consumers to experience financial distress.
Indeed, the products appear designed to prevent it. Moreover, I assert that it is
unlikely any future fringe credit products will cause financial distress because of
the structure of the fringe credit market. From these conclusions, I suggest several
implications for public policy debates about the fringe economy.
Determining whether fringe banking products produce financial distress is far
from merely an academic exercise. The answer has significant consequences for the
economy as a whole and for the individuals who depend on fringe credit products.
The alternative financial services sector has gained an increasingly prominent place
in the American economy. For instance, there are more payday lending and checkcashing outlets in the United States than McDonald’s, Burger King, Target, Sears,
JCPenney, and Wal-Mart locations combined.6 And, there are more pawnshops
than credit unions and banks combined.7 Regulatory intervention thus has the
potential to stymie or spur on significant economic activity.
In addition to the effects on the economy as a whole, regulations also affect the
people who depend on fringe banking services. For many of those who use fringe
banking, it is their only source of legal credit.8 If regulations ban that credit or
make it less accessible or more expensive because policy makers erroneously
believe the credit causes distress, those regulations will remove a source of credit
from people who desperately need it. On the other hand, if fringe banking
exacerbates financial distress, regulators should step in. Considering the vulnerable
consumer group that uses fringe banking, regulators should be especially cognizant
of the rationales and effects of their policies.
Yet, despite this important role the fringe economy plays in the lives of millions
of Americans, fringe banking products and the laws governing them have typically
operated “below the radar screen of most researchers.”9 This Article hopes to shape
the growing body of literature analyzing fringe banking10 and to contribute to the

these don’t just jeopardize the financial well-being of individual Americans—they can
threaten the stability of the entire economy.”).
5. See infra Part II.A.
6. HOWARD KARGER, SHORTCHANGED: LIFE AND DEBT IN THE FRINGE ECONOMY 6
(2005).
7. Id. at 67.
8. Mann & Hawkins, supra note 2, at 876.
9. Patrick Bolton & Howard Rosenthal, Introduction, in CREDIT MARKETS FOR THE
POOR 1, 3 (Patrick Bolton & Howard Rosenthal eds., 2005).
10. E.g., Michael S. Barr, Credit Where It Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act
and Its Critics, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513 (2005); Richard R.W. Brooks, Credit Past Due, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 994 (2006); Jim Hawkins, Renting the Good Life, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2041 (2008); Angela Littwin, Beyond Usury: A Study of Credit-Card Use and Preference
Among Low-Income Consumers, 86 TEX. L. REV. 451 (2008); Christopher L. Peterson,
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debate by developing an understanding of the relationship between fringe banking
and one of the most important bases for regulating consumer credit contracts.
Part I establishes the importance of financial distress as a rationale for
intervening into credit markets. In addition to discussing the literature appealing to
financial distress, I explore the meaning of financial distress. I argue that, despite
the claims of some, most authors use the term financial distress to mean a situation
in which a consumer has unmanageable debt. Finally, I discuss recent work done in
the context of credit cards to illustrate the methods used in that context to link
credit cards to financial distress.
The heart of the Article is Part II, which advances the claim that the link
between fringe banking products and financial distress is dubious. I demonstrate
how academics and policy makers repeatedly rely on financial distress to justify
fringe credit regulations. Analyzing several forms of fringe credit, however, reveals
this reliance is misplaced. Credit in the fringe economy is specifically structured to
prevent borrowers from experiencing financial distress. Moreover, I demonstrate
how the nature of the fringe economy will likely prevent any innovative fringe
products from ever causing financial distress.
Finally, Part III suggests three policy implications of recognizing the dubious
link between financial distress and fringe banking. First, I urge policy makers and
scholars to abandon the faulty heuristic many have applied in supporting fringe
credit regulations—that fringe credit sources operate similarly to other consumer
credit. Instead of treating all consumer credit the same, I suggest we need to
evaluate the specific attributes of credit products when crafting regulations. Second,
I suggest avenues for future research justifying fringe banking regulation—avenues
that are not dependent on the link between fringe credit and distress. Finally, I offer
suggested directions for policy makers to pursue in promulgating fringe banking
regulations. Instead of banning fringe credit products, a common response to
transactions that cause financial distress, policy makers should pursue less
aggressive regulatory interventions that target problems associated with specific
harmful attributes of fringe credit products.
I. FINANCIAL DISTRESS AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR REGULATION
This Part observes that academics frequently invoke financial distress as a
justification for consumer credit regulation. Recognizing the pivotal role financial
distress plays in justifying most consumer credit regulation is important because it
reveals the significance of understanding the link between fringe banking and
financial distress. Despite frequent use of financial distress, the term is rarely
defined, so I work through different potential meanings of the term, concluding that
most authors use financial distress to mean that consumers are suffering from
unmanageable debt. Trying to define the term is essential in assessing the claim
that fringe banking causes “financial distress.” Finally, I use the example of credit
cards to demonstrate how recent scholarship has linked consumer credit cards to
financial distress. Understanding the evidence that links credit cards and financial
Usury Law, Payday Loans, and Statutory Sleight of Hand: Salience Distortion in American
Credit Pricing Limits, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1110 (2008); Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren
& Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Less Stigma or More Financial Distress: An Empirical Analysis
of the Extraordinary Increase in Bankruptcy Filings, 59 STAN. L. REV. 213 (2006).
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distress is significant because the very characteristics of credit cards that link them
to distress are absent in products in fringe credit markets.
A. Invoking Financial Distress
Commercial law scholars frequently use financial distress as a basis for
regulating consumer credit products.11 Academics also use the risk of financial
distress to justify changes in other legal regimes as well, such as the bankruptcy
system and healthcare.12 One scholar recently pointed out the overwhelming

11. See, e.g., RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF
PAYMENT CARD MARKETS 188–89 (2006) (supporting specific credit card regulations
because of the correlation between credit card use and financial distress); Oren Bar-Gill &
Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2008) (arguing for the
creation of an agency to regulate consumer credit because “[c]onsumer credit products also
pose safety risks for customers . . . . [and] can lead to financial distress”); Laurie A.
Burlingame, Getting to the Truth of the Matter: Revising the TILA Credit Card Disclosure
Scheme to Better Protect Consumers, 61 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 308, 336 (2007) (arguing
for changes in the Truth in Lending Act “to better avoid financial distress and bankruptcy”);
Hawkins, supra note 10, at 2075–76 (positing that a link between financial distress and
renting-to-own would provide a viable basis for regulating the rent-to-own industry); Creola
Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1, 148
(2002) (“Consumers forced into these transactions already suffer financial distress
disproportionate to the rest of the general public. These borrowers should not be forced to
resort to credit sources that compound their economic hardship. Accordingly, Congress
should act to stringently regulate the payday lending industry as an important step in
equalizing consumer protection laws for all consumers, even if true equal credit opportunity
remains elusive.”); John A.E. Pottow, Private Liability for Reckless Consumer Lending,
2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 405, 463 (proposing a liability regime for reckless lending based, in
part, on the fact that reckless lending causes financial distress); Elizabeth Warren, What Is a
Women’s Issue? Bankruptcy, Commercial Law, and Other Gender-Neutral Topics, 25 HARV.
WOMEN’S L.J. 19, 54 (2002) (“If the Federal Reserve adopted more aggressive regulations
over predatory mortgage financing, tens of thousands of families that file for bankruptcy to
try to save their homes from unscrupulous lenders would be spared.”); Katherine Porter, The
Debt Dilemma, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1167, 1176 (2008) (book review) (asserting that
determining the level of credit card use for individual families suffering financial distress “is
critical to formulating effective credit regulation”). But see Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics
of Credit Cards, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 79, 83 (2000) (arguing that attempts to link bankruptcy and
credit cards do not justify regulatory intervention).
12. See, e.g., Melissa B. Jacoby, Individual Health Insurance Mandates and Financial
Distress: A Few Notes from the Debtor-Creditor Research and Debates, 55 U. KAN. L. REV.
1247, 1250–51 (2007) (evaluating Massachusetts’s universal health insurance coverage
policies by seeing how the efforts to establish universal coverage would affect financial
distress); Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy’s Fresh Start, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 67, 68 (2006) (suggesting adjustments to bankruptcy law because under
current laws people emerging from bankruptcy suffer financial distress); Eric A. Posner,
Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury
Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 284
(1995) (noting that externalities are an important factor in courts’ decision to refuse to
enforce contracts).
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importance of alleviating financial distress in bankruptcy theory, noting that “all
existing theories of bankruptcy that attempt to justify a discharge of debt for
individuals rest to some degree on eliminating the harms of financial distress.”13
Financial distress is harmful to three different groups. First, the individuals
experiencing financial distress are, under any definition of the term, distressed.
Some have suggested that the stress of debt can cause illness and can exacerbate
health problems as people go without medical treatment to service their debt.14
Additionally, financial woes can cause problems for employees who are less
productive because of their preoccupation with debt.15
Second, creditors of consumers experiencing financial distress are harmed.
Individuals who are financially distressed impose costs on their creditors when they
default on their obligations.16 If the losses are significant enough, the financial
distress of a borrower can plunge the creditor into distress.17
Finally, and most significantly from a public policy standpoint, financial distress
has spillover effects that harm parties completely unrelated to the credit contract.
Instead of internalizing the negative consequences of failed consumer loans,
borrowers and creditors impose externalities on parties unconnected to the
contract.18 Recent regulatory intervention into consumer credit markets has been
focused on curtailing externalities19 and scholars justifying regulations devote a
significant amount of energy to focusing on how credit contracts affect third
parties.20

13. Katherine Porter, The Damage of Debt (2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author).
14. See generally Melissa B. Jacoby, Does Indebtedness Influence Health? A
Preliminary Inquiry, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 560 (2002) (analyzing studies linking financial
distress and illness).
15. Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV.
749, 788 (2008).
16. MANN, supra note 11, at 50.
17. See, e.g., Linda Kotis, Comment, Chapter 13 and the Family Farm, 3 BANKR. DEV.
J. 599, 611–12 (1986) (reporting that the “severe financial distress that farmers are suffering
is threatening the stability of farm lenders” and banks that hold farm debt).
18. See Robert M. Lawless, The Limits of Contract as Product, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 160, 161 (2009) (arguing that lenders “do not fully internalize the costs of
harm caused by the products . . . [because] borrowers and their families may experience all
sorts of financial and emotional woe from improvident borrowing”).
19. See DONNCHA MARRON, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES: A SOCIOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVE FROM THE 19TH CENTURY TO THE PRESENT 11 (2009) (“The state, in general,
moved from a strategy of repression through usury interest rate caps to one of protection and
management in the interest of promoting a wider social well-being.”).
20. E.g., MANN, supra note 11, at 49–50 (arguing that financial distress “imposes
substantial costs on third parties—costs that are not considered by the parties to the credit
transactions,” such as costs to family members who are dependent on the person
experiencing distress, the social safety net which must make more pay outs to distressed
individuals, and the economy generally); Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 11, at 58–59
(arguing that the costs of poor consumer decisions “generate a series of negative
externalities”); Mann & Hawkins, supra note 2, at 884 (noting that financial distress
“increases the burden on the social safety net”); Pottow, supra note 11, at 411 (“Few
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Specifically, people experiencing financial distress are less productive, harming
employers and other consumers.21 Society is harmed as public resources are
exhausted by the financially distressed seeking help from the social safety net.22 At
the extreme, the current financial recession is a result of private consumer mortgage
contracts causing widespread financial distress.23
B. Defining Financial Distress
Although financial distress is often invoked as a justification for regulation, it is
rarely defined by the legal scholars who invoke it.24 However, to determine whether
fringe banking transactions cause financial distress, it is essential to understand
what financial distress means to the academics and policy makers who use the
concept to justify regulations. This subpart argues that most academics and policy
scholars today maintain that personal bankruptcy is a fully isolated, internalized occurrence
between a debtor and creditor alone.”); Janis Sarra, Economic Rehabilitation: Understanding
the Growth in Consumer Proposals Under Canadian Insolvency Legislation, 24 BANKING &
FIN. L. REV. 383, 392 (2009) (“[E]xcessive credit card debt can impose substantial costs on
the debtor, family members, and the general welfare safety net, as well as cost consequences
from the diminished productive activities of those individuals in financial distress.”).
21. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING PRACTICES DIRECTED
AT MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR DEPENDENTS 35–36, 45, 86–87 (2006),
available at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/report_to_congress_final.pdf; Mark Klock,
Financial Options, Real Options, and Legal Options: Opting to Exploit Ourselves and What
We Can Do About It, 55 ALA. L. REV. 63, 84 (2003) (“The larger costs of bankruptcy are
seen in what is widely termed indirect costs associated with financial distress. These are
costs associated with the fact that valuable assets that depreciate over time are underutilized
during the litigation process.”).
22. Bar-Gill, supra note 15, at 788.
23. Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage
Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1073, 1074–75 (2009); John Cassidy, Interview with
Richard Posner, NEW YORKER BLOG (Jan. 13, 2010), http://www.newyorker.com/online/
blogs/johncassidy/2010/01/interview-with-richard-posner.html#ixzz0dShg9XmX (“I don’t
think we realized there were banking externalities, and that the riskiness of banking could
facilitate a global financial crisis. That was a big oversight.”).
24. See, e.g., MANN, supra note 11, at 49–51 (examining the relationship between credit
cards and financial distress and listing the consequences of financial distress without
defining the term); Richard M. Hynes, Why (Consumer) Bankruptcy?, 56 ALA. L. REV. 121,
134 (2004) (arguing for changes in nonbankruptcy collection laws for financially distressed
consumers without defining the term); Ronald J. Mann & Katherine Porter, Saving Up for
Bankruptcy, 98 GEO. L.J. 289, 294–98 (2010) (discussing the differences between financial
distress and bankruptcy without defining financial distress); Eric S. Nguyen, Parents in
Financial Crisis: Fighting to Keep the Family Home, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 229, 230 (2008)
(analyzing whether “parents with school-age children are more likely than their childless
counterparts to keep their homes when they face financial distress” without defining
financial distress); A. Brooke Overby, Mortgage Foreclosure in Post-Katrina New Orleans,
48 B.C. L. REV. 851, 907–08 (2007) (arguing that secondary market interventions are
inadequate to prevent financial distress after natural disasters without defining financial
distress); Sullivan et al., supra note 10, at 214–15 (stating “the data are far more consistent
with the hypothesis that increased filings result from increased financial distress” without
defining the term).

1368

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 86:1361

makers who rely on financial distress use the term to describe consumers who have
unmanageable debt.
In the corporate context, there seem to be widely accepted definitions for
financial distress. The most common definition of financial distress states that firms
experience financial distress when they cannot meet their monthly debt
obligations.25 Usually financial distress is contrasted with economic distress, which
means the firm is not generating sufficient revenue to make a profit.26
Still, even in the context of businesses, the definition is not clear. Other authors
seem to employ a variety of other definitions for financial distress in the corporate
context, claiming a firm is financially distressed if it is having “difficulty
independently staying afloat”;27 stating a firm is distressed if it cannot meet its
payment obligations, not just its monthly debt service obligations;28 or asserting a
firm is financially distressed if the firm is not viable and unable to meet its monthly
debt obligations.29 One article in the corporate context sums it up: “The terms
‘financial distress’ and ‘insolvency’ are broad and ambiguous.”30

25. E.g., Ted Janger, Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy Law: Judicial Competence and
Statutory Design, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 559, 568 (2001) (“Financial distress arises when the
underlying business is sound, but is not earning sufficient income to pay its debts.”).
26. E.g., Stephen J. Lubben, The Direct Costs of Corporate Reorganization: An
Empirical Examination of Professional Fees in Large Chapter 11 Cases, 74 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 509, 546 n.146 (2000); see also Robert K. Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, Jr., The
Economic Analysis of Corporate Bankruptcy Law, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85, 88 (1995)
(“Economic distress and financial distress are conceptually distinct. Some firms that are
quite healthy in the economic sense nevertheless cannot pay off their bills because they have
excessive debt. On the other hand, some firms have no trouble paying their bills because
they have sufficient cash on hand yet still are running at an operating loss. Despite the
distinction between these two types of distress, they are positively correlated. Firms in
economic distress often are in financial distress as well. Indeed, it is often the case that the
economic distress is what is causing the financial distress.”); Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy
Primitives, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 219, 222–24 (2004) (applying this framework).
27. Ken Heyer & Sheldon Kimmel, Merger Review of Firms in Financial Distress, 5
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 103, 103 (2009).
28. Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy As
(Is) Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931, 951 n.91 (2004).
29. See Patrick G. Dunleavy, Reorganization or Liquidation?: Understanding the
Valuation Process Can Help with Making the Right Decisions, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July–
Aug. 2009, at 56, 56 (“A company in financial distress is defined as an entity that has
difficulty or is unable to meet its financial obligations as they come due. In cases of severe
financial distress, the company becomes insolvent and may file for bankruptcy under either
chapter 7 or 11.”); Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of
Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 764 (1991) (“[A] corporation is in financial distress
when it faces actual or anticipated payment demands to which its own response is or is likely
to be inadequate. . . . [A] corporation is in financial distress when its own internal
mechanisms for adaptation to actual or anticipated payment demands are severely
impaired.”); Rasmussen & Skeel, supra note 26, at 87 (defining financial distress as an
inability to pay the firm’s bills).
30. Ramesh K.S. Rao, David Simon Sokolow & Derek White, Fiduciary Duty a la
Lyonnais: An Economic Perspective on Corporate Governance in a Financially-Distressed
Firm, 22 J. CORP. L. 53, 62 (1996).
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In the individual context, scholars have offered a variety of definitions. One
possible definition of financial distress is an inability to pay one’s bills or make
ends meet. Katie Porter and Deborah Thorne seem to accept this definition; they
note some people emerging from bankruptcy are financially distressed because
“they struggled to pay their bills” and “were about 4.5 times more likely to have
difficulty making ends meet.”31 Indeed, Porter has argued that people can be “broke
without borrowing.”32 Stephen Ware, struggling to define the term, has suggested
that academics might use it even more broadly to mean having “wants exceeding
the means to pay for them”33 or being poor.34
This conception of financial distress, however, misses the key component on
which most literature on financial distress focuses—debt.35 Even for those writers
who do not explicitly equate distress with debt, debt is at the very least the most
important cause of financial distress.36
We can find further proof of the importance of debt in the concept of financial
distress by looking at how academics measure financial distress. Researchers have
noted the difficulties attendant to deciding how to measure financial distress, but
many of the measurements depend on debt. Some scholars studying individuals in
distress assert that the “best measure of a typical middle class family’s financial
distress is its debt-to-income ratio.”37 Another common indicator of financial

31. Porter & Thorne, supra note 12, at 89.
32. Porter, supra note 11, at 1177.
33. Stephen J. Ware, “Medical-Related Financial Distress” and Health Care Finance:
A Reply to Professor Melissa Jacoby, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 1259, 1263 n.25 (2007).
34. Id. at 1264.
35. See Lynn M. LoPucki & George G. Triantis, A Systems Approach to Comparing
U.S. and Canadian Reorganization of Financially Distressed Companies, 35 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 267, 274–75 n.21 (1994) (arguing that financial distress includes “both the state of
balance sheet insolvency (liabilities exceed assets) and the inability to pay obligations as
they come due”); Jay L. Zagorsky & Lois R. Lupica, A Study of Consumers’ Post-Discharge
Finances: Struggle, Stasis, or Fresh-Start?, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 283, 285 (2008)
(“While debt is commonly viewed as a central contributing factor to financial distress, debt
is also a central consequence of such distress. When income and assets are insufficient to
meet the consumptive needs of a household, the household experiences financial distress—
defined as the inability to pay debts as they come due.”); CONGRESSWOMEN CAROLYN B.
MALONEY, FOREVER IN DEBT: ANTI-COMPETITIVE CREDIT CARD PRACTICES AND THEIR
IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY 4 (2008), available at http://maloney.house.gov/
documents/financial/creditcards/20080730CreditCardFINALPub.pdf (“A high debt burden,
or financial distress, occurs when families have unusually large total debt payments relative
to their incomes, usually 40 percent.”).
36. See Sarra, supra note 20, at 392 (“Essentially, increased numbers of consumer
debtors from all social strata and from diverse regions are experiencing financial distress.
Over-extension of credit appears to be a primary driving cause.”); Sullivan et al., supra note
10, at 218 (“It shows that the central characteristic of consumer bankruptcy over two decades
has been increasing financial distress, marked by rising levels of debt.”).
37. Sullivan et al., supra note 10, at 229. A consumer’s debt-to-income ratio is not a
perfect measure of distress because a consumer may have significant valuable assets despite
having a high monthly debt payment. Allison Mann & Ronald Mann, Debt, Financial
Distress, and Bankruptcy Over the Life Course 9 (Apr. 2010) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1492845.
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distress is if consumers’ debt is larger than their assets,38 or, put another way, if
they have a negative net worth. Regardless of the imperfections in these
measurements, the focus of each measurement is the same—debt. Other
measurements of distress, such as the Debt Service Ratio and the Financial
Obligations Ratio, also focus on debt payment in relation to income.39
Merely having some debt does not constitute being financially distressed—the
debt has to be unmanageable. Having debt can be economically efficient because it
allows people to smooth consumption over their life.40 Over-indebtedness only
arises when consumers’ “current assets are no longer sufficient to offset the present
value of future debts”41 or when consumers cannot make payments and default on
their loans.
Stephen Ware is skeptical of definitions of financial distress that focus on
unmanageable debt: “Do those who propose it deny that going without what one
wants, but cannot afford, can be a source of distress? And if this ‘going without’ is
caused by lack of finances then what sort of distress is it but financial distress?”42
Yet, defining financial distress as merely having wants that exceed resources or
experiencing an inability to make ends meet is exceedingly capacious. This
definition would include a very rich individual who lacks the funds to buy an
airplane the person desires. But the inability to make this purchase does not create
harm to the social net or to the medical health of the individual—the harms that
scholars appealing to financial distress imagine. Financial distress generates
spillover effects because people face significant pressure when they are unable to
pay their debts.
A variety of sources equate financial distress and bankruptcy,43 but this
understanding of financial distress exhibits the opposite defect of Ware’s definition.

38. Kotis, supra note 17, at 610 (“The debt-to-asset ratio provides the best single
measure of the gravity of a farmer’s financial difficulties; a farmer whose debt-to-asset ratio
exceeds 40% is probably experiencing financial distress.”). This measure also is incomplete
because a consumer could have a negative net worth but not have any trouble paying their
monthly debt obligations. Mann & Mann, supra note 37, at 9.
39. Debt Service Ratio is “after-tax income available to pay minimum debts” and the
Financial Obligations Ratio is “minimum debts plus residential leases and other regular
payments.” Robert M. Lawless, Angela K. Littwin, Katherine M. Porter, John A.E. Pottow,
Deborah K. Thorne & Elizabeth Warren, Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An Empirical Study
of Consumer Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349, 370 n.75 (2008).
40. See Gianni Betti, Neil Dourmashkin, Mariacristina Rossi & Ya Ping Yin, Consumer
Over-Indebtedness in the EU: Measurements and Characteristics, 34 J. ECON. STUD. 136,
140 (2007) (“The implication of the [life-cycle-permanent-income] model for understanding
consumer indebtedness is that it is optimal for a consumer to be indebted under certain
circumstances and at certain stages of the life cycle, particularly the earlier stages. If there is
no unexpected change to total resources or expenditure requirements and in the absence of
any inter-generational transfer mechanism, the consumer’s current assets will be exactly
balanced by the present value of his/her debts over all future periods.”); Porter, supra note
11, at 1175 (“Higher levels of consumer debt may not be a cause for concern. Borrowing can
fuel economic growth, spur entrepreneurial activity, and enhance consumer quality of life.”).
41. Betti et al., supra note 40, at 140.
42. Ware, supra note 33, at 1263 n.25 (emphasis in original).
43. See, e.g., In re White Crane Trading Co., 170 B.R. 694, 703 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1994)
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It is underinclusive because not all individuals experiencing financial distress file
for bankruptcy.44 Indeed, studies have found that most people experiencing
financial distress do not file for bankruptcy.45 Over-indebted people can meet their
debt-service obligations and avoid bankruptcy by cutting out essential purchases
like medicine, and using bankruptcy as the sole measurement of financial distress
misses the people in that situation.46 But, the mere fact that people use bankruptcy
as a proxy for financial distress demonstrates that debt is at the heart of financial
distress. Even for Porter and Thorne, who define distress as an inability to pay
one’s bills, bankruptcy serves as a proxy for financial distress.47
Although I think most authors use financial distress to mean unmanageable debt,
for the purposes of this Article, I do not exclude an inability to pay one’s bills from
the definition of financial distress. Instead, I evaluate the link between fringe
banking and financial distress conceived of as either unmanageable debt or inability
to make ends meet.
C. The Link Between Credit Cards and Financial Distress
This subpart illustrates how scholars link credit products to financial distress by
analyzing the case of credit cards. A significant amount of debate has surrounded
the question of whether credit cards contribute to distress,48 but the work linking
credit cards to financial failure is better than the work linking any other form of
(“Bankruptcy presents a classic distress scenario. Mere use of the word ‘bankruptcy’
conveys essentially the same message as ‘financial distress’ or ‘going out of business.’ The
consumer has a sense of urgency and expects lower prices and greater bargaining power.”);
Richard A. Brown & Susan E. Burhouse, Implications of the Supply-Side Revolution in
Consumer Lending, 24 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 363, 366 (2005) (“[W]e find that the
incidence of household financial distress, as measured by per capita personal bankruptcy
filings, has risen dramatically since the mid-1980s.”).
44. For the distinction of these terms in the corporate context, see Donald R. Korobkin,
The Unwarranted Case Against Corporate Reorganization: A Reply to Bradley and
Rosenzweig, 78 IOWA L. REV. 669, 717 (1993) (“Toward this end, it is useful to define two
terms—‘financial distress’ and ‘bankruptcy.’ These terms are conceptually distinct.
Financial distress is a situation in which a corporation’s capacity to adjust to actual or
anticipated payment demands is severely impaired. Bankruptcy, as the term is sometimes
used by financial economists, refers specifically to the cancellation of ownership of a firm—
or the transfer of such ownership from shareholders to debtholders—resulting from
conditions of financial distress. While financial distress is a general economic condition,
bankruptcy is a legal and financial event that sometimes results from financial distress.”).
45. Mann & Porter, supra note 24, at 290 (“On the one hand, only a fraction of those in
serious financial distress will ever file for bankruptcy. . . . That is, most families in serious
financial distress do not file for bankruptcy. In fact, each year foreclosure filings outstrip
bankruptcy filings because many families do not even try to use bankruptcy to save their
homes. Similarly, thousands of families are subject to collection calls for medical bills, and
yet the number of bankruptcy filings—even at its pinnacle—represents only a sliver of those
struggling with bills.”).
46. See Betti et al., supra note 40, at 141.
47. See Porter & Thorne, supra note 12, at 118.
48. See Adam Feibelman, Defining the Social Insurance Function of Consumer
Bankruptcy, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 129, 165 n.197 (2005) (collecting sources arguing
for both sides of the debate about whether credit cards cause bankruptcy).
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credit to distress.49 This illustration of credit cards is far from mere background
information. It demonstrates the sorts of arguments one would have to make to
establish that fringe banking causes financial distress.
Beyond illustrating how the best arguments link credit products to financial
distress, examining credit cards is important to the thesis of this Article because of
the contrasting ways credit cards and fringe financing work. Policy makers and
academics often treat credit cards and fringe credit products as the same, but a
careful look at both demonstrates the important ways they are different. More
significantly, the very characteristics that link credit cards to financial distress are
missing from fringe credit products.
1. Evidence Credit Cards Cause Financial Distress
Ronald Mann’s book Charging Ahead: The Growth and Regulation of Payment
Card Markets50 offers the best evidence to date that credit cards cause financial
distress. This section briefly explains his research design and the conclusions he
reaches.
To evaluate the effect of credit cards on financial distress, Mann performed a
regression analysis on country-level aggregate data from five countries. To isolate
the relationship between credit card debt and bankruptcy, he used a multivariate
model with credit card debt, consumer debt, and credit card spending as
explanatory variables and bankruptcy filings (as a proxy for financial distress) as
the dependent variable.51 To ensure that credit card debt and not other variables or
country-specific differences caused the increased bankruptcy rates he observed,
Mann incorporated unemployment and GDP as independent variables, and he
incorporated dummy variables.52 Finally, to establish that the causation relationship
ran from credit cards to bankruptcy and not the reverse, his explanatory variable of
credit card debt was lagged a year.53
Based on this analysis, Mann found that “[e]ven if credit card spending and
consumer debt are held constant, an increase in credit card debt—a shift of
consumer borrowing from noncard borrowing to card borrowing—is associated
with an increase in bankruptcy filings.”54 With an increase of only $100 per capita
of credit card debt, the size of the effect is 165 bankruptcy filings.55 Using a similar
analysis, Mann also found that credit card spending is a significant contributor to
consumer debt.56

49. See Sean Hannon Williams, Sticky Expectations: Responses to Persistent OverOptimism in Marriage, Employment Contracts, and Credit Card Use, 84 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 733, 741, 786 n.285 (2009) (collecting sources).
50. MANN, supra note 11.
51. Id. at 64–65.
52. Id. at 66.
53. Id. at 64–65.
54. Id. at 66.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 53.
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Mann qualifies his findings in several ways, admitting the number of data points
is small57 and acknowledging his use of country-level data cannot account for
individual families’ uses of credit card debt.58 Some critical commentary suggests
similar deficiencies.59 Still, Mann’s analysis offers a highly credible link between
financial distress and credit cards.60
2. Characteristics of Credit Cards that Cause Financial Distress
Simply finding that credit cards cause financial distress is not as useful as
understanding the mechanisms for how credit cards cause distress. Credit cards
have several characteristics that create a link between this form of credit and
financial distress.
First, credit cards likely contribute to financial distress because they make it
easy to accumulate debt painlessly. For most credit products, every time borrowers
want loans, they have to go to the lender, fill out an application, undergo a credit
check, and wait for a decision. Credit cards, however, are a form of revolving
credit.61 The borrower makes a single decision to open an account, the lender sets a
credit limit, and then the borrower can accumulate debt simply by swiping a card.
The borrower does not have to go through the ritual of obtaining a new loan but
rather can unreflectively accumulate debt.
Because of this easy access to credit, consumers spend more using credit cards
than other forms of credit. In part, people spend more when using credit cards
because of the ease of making payments with a credit card. It is easier to
underappreciate the cost of something when paying with a single swipe than when
counting out the dollars and cents for the transaction.62 Similarly, we might expect

57. Id. at 67.
58. Id. at 62.
59. See Porter, supra note 11, at 1176 (“Applying Mann’s insights on these
macroeconomic relationships to the behavior of individual families is complex. As Mann
acknowledges, aggregate data do not reveal how the effects of credit card use are distributed
across individual families. The distribution could show that either a relatively small number
of families in bankruptcy borrowed quite heavily on credit cards before bankruptcy or that
nearly all families in bankruptcy modestly increased their credit card borrowing before
bankruptcy.” (footnote omitted)).
60. See id. at 1174 (“Mann’s empirical analysis establishes a positive relationship
between credit card use and increased consumer debt. Neither the concise nature of the
foregoing sentence nor its ‘obviousness’ to an armchair empiricist should diminish the power
of Mann’s achievement.” (footnote omitted)).
61. KARGER, supra note 6, at 42.
62. MANN, supra note 11, at 46; see also Ronald J. Mann, Unsafe at Any Price?, 157 U.
PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 167, 176 (2009) (“In my view, however troubling the contract
terms that dominate current legislative discourse may be, it is much more important to focus
on reforms that will respond to the culture of unreflective borrowing and consumption.”).
Similarly, accumulating debt in small increments likely causes people to not appreciate the
full amount of the debt they are incurring. TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY
LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER
CREDIT IN AMERICA 170–79 (1989).
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that people fail to comprehend the full significance of accumulating debt when they
do not have to undergo the full ritual of applying for a new loan.
Research confirms this hypothesis, suggesting that consumers using credit cards
spend more because of the availability bias. The availability bias is a defect in
consumer reasoning: people tend to overestimate the likelihood of some events if
those events are easy to remember, but they underestimate the likelihood of other
events that are less readily available for the mind to recall.63 Studying this bias in
the context of credit cards, research has found that people do not think about their
past expenditures on credit cards because their decision to spend on a card does not
impose the immediate pain of having to part with cash.64 Because the experience of
spending (and borrowing) is relatively painless due to the revolving nature of credit
card debt, people underestimate the significance of accumulating debt.
This propensity to spend is even more likely to contribute to runaway debt
because people are overly optimistic about how much debt they will eventually
incur when they first establish their credit accounts. Behavioral economists have
documented an optimism bias in consumer decision making.65 In the context of
credit cards, this bias causes consumers to underestimate the likelihood that they
will experience financial shocks such as expensive medical bills or additional
expenses from losing one’s job.66 People may have no intention to actually incur
unmanageable debt when they establish their credit account, but in reality, many
do.
In addition to allowing consumers to accumulate debt painlessly, a second
characteristic of credit cards that creates a link to financial distress is the fact that
credit cards allow consumers to accumulate significant amounts of debt. The
amount of money credit card companies lend to consumers is based on the
consumer’s projected future income.67 Historically, debt obligations were tied to
the value of tangible goods, but early in the twentieth century, salary lenders
“began to make loans less on the security of tangible capital that defined traditional
pawnbroking and increasingly around the abstract conception of future wages.”68
Lending based on the notion of future wages allows borrowers to access
significant amounts of credit because credit cards operate without many of the
constraints of other loans. In addition to not being tied to the value of the goods
purchased,69 credit card limits are not constrained by the amount the consumer is
paid during any specific pay period. Instead, companies, theoretically at least,
estimate a person’s general future income. If a consumer loses her job, she still has

63. See Steven J. Cleveland, An Economic and Behavioral Analysis of Investment
Bankers When Delivering Fairness Opinions, 58 ALA. L. REV. 299, 328 (2006).
64. See Dilip Soman, Effects of Payment Mechanism on Spending Behavior: The Role of
Rehearsal and Immediacy of Payments, 27 J. CONSUMER RES. 460, 471 (2001).
65. See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1395–1401
(2004).
66. Id. at 1375–76.
67. See MARRON, supra note 19, at 121.
68. Id. at 11.
69. See id. at 84–85 (“[The credit card] is also divorced from the specific goods it
finances, encompassing the continuous, ongoing process of consumption facilitated through
the widening scope of such credit.”).
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access to the entire credit limit. The access to credit is independent of the
consumer’s actual income after the credit limit is approved, and credit card
companies frequently increase consumers’ credit limits.70 Indeed, in practice, banks
do not typically even evaluate borrowers’ actual future incomes at all but rely
solely on credit scores to gain information about credit usage.71
Because credit cards do not rely on external restraints other than a person’s
credit score, they depend on consumers exercising self-constraint. As Donncha
Marron has argued:
The relative absence of external constraints on individual action, in
contrast to the characteristics of installment credit, actually requires an
increasing need for self-constraint as to a consumer’s momentary
impulses, enhanced foresight as to the consequences of their actions
and an ability to increasingly manage their own behavior, in an
objective and instrumental way, over longer and more complexly
interwoven periods of time.72
The net effect of unconstrained credit limits is that people must depend solely on
themselves to keep out of unmanageable debt. They are offered access to
significant amounts of debt because neither the cost of the goods they are
purchasing nor their specific income sets their credit limit.
This lack of external constraints would not be a problem, of course, if credit
card limits were set low or were set at an amount guaranteed to be manageable for
users. In fact, however, credit card companies offer consumers very high credit
limits.73 For instance, 36.8% of American Express’s accounts have credit limits
over $20,000.74 Some small business owners report their preference for credit cards
precisely because they offer “extremely high credit limits.”75 Credit cards aim to
allow consumers to borrow one-fifth of their annual salary on a single card alone.76
These high limits give consumers ample room to accumulate significant debt.

70. See MARRON, supra note 19, at 85; Dilip Soman & Amar Cheema, The Effect of
Credit and Spending Decisions: The Role of Credit Limit and Credibility, 21 MARKETING
SCI. 32, 37 (2002).
71. Soman & Cheema, supra note 70, at 36 (“[T]here seems to be no explicit use of
future income projections in making credit-limit decisions.” (emphasis in original)).
72. MARRON, supra note 19, at 86.
73. See Stephen Koff & Tom Diemer, U.S. Senate Approves Bankruptcy Revisions,
PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), Dec. 8, 2000, at 1C (“The National Consumer Law Center
said credit-card companies are actually encouraging high indebtedness, inundating the public
with easy-to-get credit cards and high credit limits.”); Editorial, Whose (De)Fault Is It?, SAN
JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Cal.), June 18, 1998, at 10B (“[T]he [credit card] industry claims no
culpability for pushing credit cards and high credit limits on people who can’t handle
them.”).
74. Harry Terris, Dissecting Issuer Accounts, AM. BANKER, Dec. 28, 2009, at 9.
75. Mark Glover, Entrepreneurs Using Plastic for Finances: Credit Cards Overtake
Bank Loans, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 30, 1998, at C1.
76. Laura Ruane, Credit Card Competition Fierce: Banks Pull Out All Stops to Attract
More Customers, NEWS-PRESS (Fort Myers, Fla.), June 15, 1999, at 1D (“[C]ard issuers aim
for a 5-to-1 income-to-credit ratio. A household with $50,000 total income probably would
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Finally, giving consumers high credit limits leads to the last characteristic of
credit card transactions that engenders financial distress—the fact consumers use
high credit limits as guides of how much debt to incur. Researchers have observed
that when credit limits are high, consumers will erroneously assume they can
manageably borrow a lot of money.
Dilip Soman and Amar Cheema conducted a series of experiments with students
to test what effect a credit card’s credit limit has on spending behavior.77 They
found that students spent more money if their credit limits were higher.78 Soman
and Cheema theorize that
consumers use information such as the credit limit as a signal of their
future earnings potential. Specifically, if consumers have access to
large amounts of credit, they are likely to infer that their lifetime
income will be high and hence their willingness to use credit (and their
spending) will also be high.79
Using one’s credit limit as a heuristic to determine debt levels makes sense
because lenders exogenously set limits based, theoretically at least, on very good
data about a consumer’s future earning potential.80 Indeed, some have argued that
lenders have a much better idea about whether a consumer will default on a loan
than the consumer does.81 As it turns out, however, banks are not good at
determining a consumer’s projected earnings, so credit limits are an unreliable
heuristic for consumers to use.82 Thus, when consumers take on debt based on high
credit limits that do not actually mirror future earning potential, we should not be
surprised they experience unmanageable debt.
These three characteristics of credit cards are significant not only as an
illustration of how a credit product can cause financial distress but also as a point of
contrast with fringe banking products. For consumers borrowing on the fringe,
none of these characteristics will likely be part of any credit product they use. Part
II uses these distinctions and the characteristics of modern fringe credit markets to
argue that fringe banking does not cause financial distress.
II. THE DUBIOUS LINK BETWEEN FRINGE BANKING AND FINANCIAL DISTRESS
In this Part, I first establish the prevalence of the claim that fringe banking
causes financial distress in academic literature and policy debates. My project of
understanding the relationship between fringe credit and distress would be of little
significance if scholars and policy makers did not believe there was any
connection. In fact, both groups frequently assume or argue that fringe credit is
linked to financial distress.
qualify for a $10,000 credit line . . . .” (quoting president of credit-card monitoring company
CardWeb.com)).
77. Soman & Cheema, supra note 70, at 38.
78. Id. at 39.
79. Id. at 32.
80. Id. at 36.
81. See Pottow, supra note 11, at 432.
82. Soman & Cheema, supra note 70, at 50.
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Parts II.C and II.D challenge that claim. I survey the existing forms of fringe
credit and analyze their propensity to cause financial distress, defined both as
unmanageable debt and an inability to make ends meet. Then, I offer evidence that
any future fringe banking products will similarly have no causal connection to
financial distress.
A. Academics Frequently Argue that Fringe Banking Causes Financial Distress
Academics frequently make the claim that fringe banking transactions cause
consumers to experience financial distress. More subtly, academics often lump
fringe banking products with other consumer credit products which do cause
financial distress and treat them all the same.
First, two of the three books that extensively analyze fringe banking explicitly
claim that fringe banking products cause financial distress.83 In his 2005 book
Shortchanged: Life and Debt in the Fringe Economy, sociologist Harold Karger
surveys the abuses in the fringe economy and suggests federal regulations. One of
the problems he claims that fringe credit sources create is unmanageable debt:
“While the fringe economy makes goods and services available to consumers who
can’t otherwise afford them, it also traps them in a cycle of debt. . . . [V]ulnerable
consumers are dragged deeper into a quagmire of debt.”84 Fringe products produce
this distress, Karger claims, through “rates and terms that are almost impossible to
satisfy.”85 In addition to these direct claims, Karger also conflates the effects of
fringe banking with the effects of credit cards by assuming that fringe products and
credit cards have the exact same effect on consumers’ debt loads.86
Similarly, law professor Christopher Peterson’s 2004 book Taming the Sharks:
Towards a Cure for the High Cost Credit Market uses the risk of unmanageable
debt to make the case for significant regulatory intervention into the fringe
economy. Peterson’s first line of attack against fringe banking products is that they
cause bankruptcies: “An excellent first example of an externality associated with
high-cost credit transactions is the social costs incurred in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy
has proven to be an inevitable result of high-cost credit transactions.”87 His
assertions about payday lending’s link to bankruptcy is even more specific. He
argues that payday loans can become “a trap [some debtors] cannot escape without
missing rent, utilities, car payments, or food expenditures. These loans can create a

83. The only significant book about the fringe economy that does not discuss the
relationship between financial distress and fringe banking products is economist John
Caskey’s book Fringe Banking: Check-Cashing Outlets, Pawnshops, and the Poor. JOHN P.
CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING: CHECK-CASHING OUTLETS, PAWNSHOPS, AND THE POOR (1994).
This fact is not surprising, however, because Caskey only spends eight of 150 pages talking
about pawnshop regulations. Id. at 116–23. He does not make any claims about the link
between pawnshops and financial distress.
84. KARGER, supra note 6, at xii.
85. Id. at xv.
86. See id. at xvi.
87. CHRISTOPHER L. PETERSON, TAMING THE SHARKS: TOWARDS A CURE FOR THE HIGHCOST CREDIT MARKET 205 (2004) (emphasis added).
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biweekly cycle of income and expenses leaving only enough surplus income to pay
the most recent accrual of interest and fees.”88
In some ways, Peterson’s claims are more reserved than Karger’s. For instance,
while implying that the relationship between bankruptcy and fringe credit sources
is strong, he notes that we have no reliable data on what portion of the debt
discharged in bankruptcy comes from fringe financers.89 Additionally, he
recognizes that pawn loans do not leave consumers indebted to pawnshops.90 Still,
like Karger, for the most part, Peterson lumps fringe banking transactions together
with other forms of credit, treating them all as if they cause financial distress.
Another influential book is Robert Manning’s Credit Card Nation. Manning’s
focus is broader than just the fringe economy, but he devotes significant attention
to it.91 The conclusion of Manning’s analysis is straightforward—he maintains that
fringe credit transactions leave consumers deep in debt to lenders: “In sum, as long
as the proliferation of corporate loan sharks is not effectively regulated, the most
economically disadvantaged will find themselves ensnared in new forms of debt
peonage relationships.”92 This conclusion, like Peterson’s and Karger’s
conclusions, treats pawnshops, payday loans, rent-to-own, and auto title lending as
having the same effects on people as credit cards.
In addition to these books, legal scholars frequently claim that credit in the
alternative financial services sector leads to financial distress. Some scholars claim
the increased availability of credit is to blame because it allows “consumers to
become highly leveraged” which in turn has caused increased bankruptcy rates.93
Others posit that fringe products, like payday loans and auto title loans, cause
bankruptcies and overindebtedness because they are “low-quality credit at very
high rates and with predatory foreclosure rates.”94 Finally, other sources continue
the trend of treating fringe products like payday loans and auto title loans the same
as mortgages, claiming they all cause financial distress.95

88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 14.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 20.
See ROBERT D. MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION: THE CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA’S
ADDICTION TO CREDIT 195–225 (2000) (surveying and analyzing fringe credit transactions).
92. Id. at 225. Debt peonage is “the system, prevalent in the post–Civil War South, in
which debtors were forced to work for their creditors.” Paul Krugman, The Debt-Peonage
Society, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2005, at A23.
93. Diane Hellwig, Note, Exposing the Loansharks in Sheep’s Clothing: Why ReRegulating the Consumer Credit Market Makes Economic Sense, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1567, 1578–79 (2005).
94. Jean Braucher, Response to Eric Posner, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 463, 468
(2002).
95. See Kristin Brandser Kalsem, Bankruptcy Reform and the Financial Well-Being of
Women: How Intersectionality Matters in Money Matters, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1181, 1228–29
(2006) (“Another key source of irresponsibility that was highlighted in the bankruptcy
reform process was that of predatory lenders—in the home mortgage market, as well as with
respect to payday loans and car title loans. Again, this was a hot topic in the media, as well
as in the congressional debates themselves. For example, in an attempt to hold these lenders
responsible for their contributions to the increase in bankruptcy filings, Senator Durbin
offered an amendment that would prohibit a predatory mortgage lender who had violated the
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By far the most common claim in the legal literature is that payday lending
bankrupts consumers.96 There are three theories for why payday loans cause
financial distress. First, some claim consumers experience financial failure because
the costs of payday loans are so high relative to borrowers’ incomes.97 Second,
many people claim that payday borrowers repeatedly rollover their loans,
transforming what looks like a short-term debt into a long-term obligation.98
Finally, one recent paper theorizes that interest payments for payday loans tip
people on the brink of bankruptcy into bankruptcy.99 The merits of these three
arguments are taken up in Part II.C.
Truth in Lending Act from pursuing its claim in bankruptcy.” (footnote omitted)).
96. See, e.g., Sullivan et al., supra note 10, at 250–51 (“[C]hanges in credit practices
may have permitted debtors to become more indebted when they are under financial stress,
thus increasing the number of people who must turn to bankruptcy following a financial
reversal and increasing the debt loads they carry when they file for bankruptcy. . . . Even
nonhomeowners could stay in the credit game when they were in financial trouble. A new
player—the payday lender—made sure that there would be cash to pay the landlord or the
daycare center even for those with the worst credit records.”); Catherine E. Vance & Paige
Barr, The Facts and Fiction of Bankruptcy Reform, 1 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 361, 415
(2003) (“Payday loans are another example of the culture that seems to encourage practices
that lead to bankruptcy.”); Lisa Blaylock Moss, Note, Modern Day Loan Sharking: Deferred
Presentment Transactions & the Need for Regulation, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1725, 1727 (2000)
(“On a practical level, these short-term lenders prey upon less-sophisticated consumers,
sending many into an unending cycle of indebtedness and contributing to record-high levels
of personal bankruptcy in the United States.” (footnote omitted)); Kelly J. Noyes, Comment,
Get Cash Until Payday! The Payday-Loan Problem in Wisconsin, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1627,
1645 (“Wisconsin consumer bankruptcy filings establish that bankruptcy petitioners with
payday loans go bankrupt sooner than other debtors . . . .”); Kristina Scott, Payday Lending,
PRESS-REGISTER (Mobile, Ala.), Nov. 22, 2009, at A19 (“[P]ayday lending is a broken
product that ensnares borrowers in unmanageable debt. . . . [U]sing payday loans doubles the
risk a borrower will end up in bankruptcy within two years. . . .”).
97. See Moss, supra note 96, at 1742 (“The high rates alone contribute to unmanageable
levels of personal indebtedness among low and modest income households, sending many
desperate consumers into a downward spiral of indebtedness which ultimately forces them
into bankruptcy.” (footnote omitted)).
98. See, e.g., JEAN ANN FOX & ED MIERZWINSKI, SHOW ME THE MONEY!: A SURVEY OF
PAYDAY LENDERS AND REVIEW OF PAYDAY LENDER LOBBYING IN STATE LEGISLATURES 8
(2000) (“These loans are designed to keep consumers in perpetual debt.”); PETERSON, supra
note 87, at 14 (“These loans can create a biweekly cycle of income and expenses leaving
only enough surplus income to pay the most recent accrual of interest and fees.”); Carmen
M. Butler & Niloufar A. Park, Mayday Payday: Can Corporate Social Responsibility Save
Payday Lenders?, 3 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 121 (2006) (“Over 70% of consumers
were repeat consumers, taking from two to nineteen loans during a one-year period. These
statistics, including lending fees and the rate of repeat consumers, help illustrate how
consumers can easily become trapped in a web of accumulated loans and finance charges
that can ultimately lead to grave debt or bankruptcy.” (footnote omitted)); Beth Musgrave,
Beshear Backs Payday-Loan Rate Cap Interest Would Top Out at 36%; Industry Opposed,
LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Ky.), Dec. 16, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 25268444 (“A
July report by the Center for Responsible Lending showed that many people borrow from
one lender to pay off another. Consumer advocates say this often causes a cycle of debt that
traps consumers.”).
99. Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Do Payday Loans Cause Bankruptcy? 2
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B. Policy Makers Rely on Financial Distress to Justify Fringe Banking Regulation
While it is troubling that academics support fringe banking legislation because
of a purported link to financial distress, it is more disturbing that policy makers do
the same thing. This subpart presents evidence of this from several statutes that
affect the fringe banking industry, focusing primarily on a bill that was passed by
Congress and signed by President Obama in July 2010. It is important to
demonstrate that policy makers do in fact rely on financial distress because
otherwise this Article has theoretical implications but little practical significance.
As the following hopes to prove, however, financial distress is a central
justification for fringe banking regulations. Even if the ultimate effects of these
regulations are positive for reasons other than preventing financial distress, it is
disturbing to realize a key rationale behind them was flawed. And, more often than
not, faulty reasoning yields faulty results, so determining the relationship between
fringe banking and financial distress is important to ensure policy makers craft
sound policies.
The most prominent recent example of policy makers using financial distress to
justify fringe banking regulations is President Obama’s successful efforts to pass a
financial reform bill that creates a new federal bureau within the Federal Reserve to
regulate financial products.100 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act establishes, “in the Federal Reserve System, an independent bureau
to be known as the ‘Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection,’ which shall
regulate the offering and provision of consumer financial products or services
under the Federal consumer financial laws.”101 The bill gives the Bureau the
specific power to take action “to prevent a covered person or service provider from
committing or engaging in an unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or practice under
Federal law in connection with any transaction with a consumer for a consumer
financial product or service.”102
An important justification articulated for the Bureau has been that underregulated consumer credit products cause financial distress.103 The Obama
(Vanderbilt University Law Sch. Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 11-13, Feb. 23, 2011),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1266215.
100. The bill establishing the Bureau was signed into law July 21, 2010. President Barack
Obama, Remarks by the President at Signing of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (July 21, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/remarks-president-signing-dodd-frank-wall-street-reform-and-consumer-protectionact. Representative Barney Frank (D-Mass.) first introduced H.R. 3126 in July of 2009 “[t]o
establish the Consumer Financial Protection Agency, and for other purposes” to both the
Committee on House Financial Services and the Committee on Energy and Commerce.
Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009, H.R. 3126, 111th Cong. Senate
Banking Committee Chairman Christopher Dodd (D-Conn.) released a bill on November 10,
2009 also proposing the creation of a Consumer Financial Protection Agency. Stephen
Labaton, Fed Moves to Limit Overdraft Fees for Debit Cards and A.T.M. Transactions, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 13, 2009, at B3.
101. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 1011(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1964 (2010).
102. Id. § 1031(a), 124 Stat. at 2005.
103. In another article, I report empirical data on the justifications offered in the media
and government reports for the Bureau regulating fringe credit. I found that 15% of articles
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Administration, the press, and legal academics have all emphasized that the
Bureau’s goal is to prevent financial distress. First, the Obama Administration has
stressed that past unregulated lending caused financial distress both to individuals
and to the economy generally. For instance, in a speech in October 2009, one of
President Obama’s central messages supporting the Bureau was that predatory
financing practices leave people financially distressed: “But my concern are the
millions of Americans who behaved responsibly and yet still found themselves in
jeopardy because of the predatory practices of some in the financial industry.”104
The President has also stressed the negative externalities generated through
unregulated lending, criticizing the big financial firms for opposing the Bureau
after taxpayers bailed them out.105 In his first State of the Union address, President
Obama called for financial reforms to prevent lenders from taking “risks that
threaten the whole economy.”106
Second, the press has furthered the notion that the Bureau is meant to minimize
personal financial distress and systemic implications of personal financial woes.107
A Boston Globe editorial makes plain the editorialists’ understanding that the
Bureau is a solution to the externalities caused by consumer lending:
The new Consumer Financial Protection Agency proposed by the
Obama administration is needed to correct obvious flaws in the
financial system and to prevent a repeat of last year’s economic
collapse. Predatory marketing of subprime mortgages was a root cause
of the current recession. Those toxic loans were bundled in opaque
mortgage-backed securities that went hurtling through the global
financial system, destroying enormous sums of investor wealth and
nearly paralyzing credit markets. Nothing could be more clearly in the
national interest than to avoid a recurrence of that financial
pathology.108

that justify the Bureau covering fringe credit give the link to financial distress as a rationale.
Jim Hawkins, The Federal Government in the Fringe Economy, 14 CHAP. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2011).
104. Remarks, Consumer Financial Protection, supra note 4.
105. See David Stout & Stephen Labaton, Vote Backs a Financial Oversight Body, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 23, 2009, at B3.
106. President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-union-address.
107. See, e.g., Brady Dennis, Consumer Groups Praise Idea of Financial Protection
Agency, WASH. POST, July 17, 2009, at A13 (“The idea is to help safeguard Americans
against deceptive and abusive lending practices that contributed to the current crisis.”); Anne
Flaherty, Consumer Protection Bill Approved: House Panel OK’s New Regulator for Loans,
Credit Cards, BOS. GLOBE, Oct. 23, 2009, at 8 (“The proposed Consumer Financial
Protection Agency is a cornerstone to Obama’s broader plan to clamp down on Wall Street
and prevent much of the reckless lending that contributed to last year’s near-collapse of the
market.”).
108. Editorial, To Fix Financial System, Protect Consumers First, BOS. GLOBE, Oct. 15,
2009, at 18.
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A more subtle, although extremely persuasive, means by which the
Administration109 and media110 have promoted the idea that the Bureau’s purpose is
minimizing financial distress is by focusing attention on the credit products under
the Bureau’s jurisdiction that most commonly cause financial distress and
externalities: credit cards and mortgages. One statement by an editorialist typifies
the focus on credit cards and mortgage lending: “The country needs a regulator that
will keep financial consumers from being taken to the cleaners by their bank or
their mortgage broker or their credit card issuer.”111
Finally, academics have recognized that the Administration has justified the
Bureau because the subprime mortgage crisis subjected individuals and the
worldwide economy to financial distress.112 For instance, in his post for The

109. See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection
of the H. Committee on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 3–4 (2009) (statement of
Assistant Secretary Michael Barr), available at http://republicans.energycommerce.
house.gov/Media/file/Hearings/CTCP/070809_Consumer_Financial_Protection_Agency/Bar
r%20Commerce%20Committee%20Testimony%20Final.pdf (focusing the details of his
discussion on problems in the mortgage and credit card industries); Press Release, U.S.
Dep’t of Treasury, Administration’s Regulatory Reform Agenda Moves Forward:
Legislation for Strengthening Consumer Protection Delivered to Capitol Hill, available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/tg189.htm (“This new agency will implement and
enforce the new credit card bill signed into law by President Obama and Congress and have
authority to combat the worst abuses in mortgage markets.”).
110. See Dennis, supra note 107 (“The administration envisions a new agency with broad
powers to oversee a range of financial products, from mortgages to credit cards.”); Anne
Flaherty, Senate Democrats Aim to Curb Fed: Bill Would Shift Oversight Powers to 3 New
Agencies, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 11, 2009, at 6 (“Among the top points of contention is Dodd’s
desire to create a Consumer Financial Protection Agency to protect consumers taking out
home loans or using credit cards against predatory lending and surprise interest rate hikes.”);
Stephen Labaton, Leading Senator Pushes New Plan to Oversee Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
20, 2009, at A1 (“Like the president, Mr. Dodd supports the creation of a new consumer
financial protection agency to both write and enforce new rules protecting households from
credit cards and mortgages with abusive or deceptive terms.”); Jim Puzzanghera, Banker
Gets an Earful, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2009, at B1 (“Liberals have sharply criticized it for
taking 14 years—from 1994 to 2008—to adopt rules to protect consumers from
unscrupulous mortgage lending. The Obama administration has hammered the Fed on that
point as well, a major reason it has proposed shifting consumer protection powers from the
Fed and other regulators to the new Consumer Financial Protection Agency.”).
111. Joe Nocera, The Consumer Financial Protection Agency Gets a Big Push . . . , N.Y.
TIMES EXECUTIVE SUITE BLOGS (Oct. 9, 2009), http://executivesuite.blogs.
nytimes.com/2009/10/09/the-consumer-financial-protection-agency-gets-a-big-push.
112. See Lawless, supra note 18, at 161 (“The proposal is far from fanciful. A bill to
establish such a commission was introduced before the 110th Congress, and such a proposal
will be attractive to leaders of the 111th Congress, who will want to report to constituents
that they took some action against the reckless consumer lending that is blamed for the
current economic woes.” (footnote omitted)); Joshua Wright & Todd Zywicki, Three
Problematic Truths About the Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009,
LOMBARD STREET, Sept. 14, 2009, at 29, 29, available at http://www.finreg21.com/lombardstreet/three-problematic-truths-about-consumer-financial-protection-agency-act-2009 (“The
foundational premise of the CFPA is that a failure of consumer protection . . . was a
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Atlantic opposing the Bureau, Richard Posner notes that the “statute is intended to
prevent a repetition of the current financial crisis.”113 More significantly, Oren BarGill and Elizabeth Warren’s article Making Credit Safer, which is the academic
foundation for the Bureau, employs financial distress as a justification for creating
a federal agency to regulate consumer credit:
Consumer credit products also pose safety risks for customers. Credit
cards, subprime mortgages, and payday loans can lead to financial
distress, bankruptcy, and foreclosure. Economic losses can be imposed
on innocent third parties, including neighbors of foreclosed property,
and widespread economic instability may affect economic growth and
job prospects for millions of families that never took on a risky
financial instrument.114
If the Bureau were only intended to cover credit cards and mortgages, this
rationale may make sense, but the bill empowers the Bureau to regulate the fringe
economy. The bill governs “consumer financial product[s],” which are defined as
“financial product[s]” used for household purposes.115 The definition of financial
products is expansive, and it includes “extending credit.”116 Thus, the plain
language of the bill explicitly reaches every fringe banking transaction discussed in
this Article except rent-to-own transactions because each of these transactions
explicitly involves an extension of credit. The bill does cover leases like rent-toown arrangements if “(I) the lease is on a non-operating basis [and] (II) the initial
term of the lease is at least 90 days.”117 Rent-to-own leases are non-operating leases
because the lessee retains ownership at the end of the lease, but most initial lease
terms are not ninety days. Thus, renting-to-own is probably not covered by this
definition of a lease.118 Still, the Bureau may have authority over rent-to-own
contracts either if the Bureau determines that renting-to-own is really an extension
of credit, as several courts have done,119 or if the Bureau wants to define rent-toown transactions as a financial activity by rule.120

meaningful cause of the financial crisis and that the CFPA would have or could have averted
the crisis or lessened its effects.”). In addition to legal academics, consumer advocates
explicitly link the need for the CFPA with financial distress. See Dennis, supra note 107, at
A13 (“It targets the most significant underlying causes of the massive regulatory failures that
have harmed millions of Americans.” (quoting Travis Plunkett, legislative director for the
Consumer Federation of America)).
113. Richard A. Posner, The Proposed Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of
2009, ATLANTIC (July 4, 2009, 5:25 PM), http://correspondents.theatlantic.com/richard
_posner/2009/07/the_proposed_consumer_financial_protection_agency_act_of_2009.php.
114. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 11, at 3.
115. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 1002(5), 124 Stat. 1956 (2010).
116. Id. § 1002(15)(A)(i), 124 Stat. at 1958.
117. Id. § 1002(15)(A)(ii), 124 Stat. at 1958.
118. For a more extensive discussion of the Bureau’s relationship to fringe credit, see
Hawkins, supra note 103.
119. See, e.g., Perez v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 892 A.2d 1255, 1268 (N.J. 2006) (finding
rent-to-own transactions are extensions of credit).
120. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
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Not only does the statute’s language cover fringe banking products, the
Administration, in supporting the Bureau, specifically has stated the bill includes
fringe banking products and that these products are included because they cause
financial distress. In a speech supporting the Bureau, President Obama invited a
woman who had taken out a payday loan to serve as an example of the type of
transactions the Bureau would regulate.121 In his speech, he specifically linked
payday lending to wide-scale financial distress: “[A]buses like these don’t just
jeopardize the financial well-being of individual Americans—they can threaten the
stability of the entire economy.”122 Other members of the Administration testifying
to Congress also stress that fringe banking products would be under the Bureau’s
umbrella: “A wide range of credit products are offered—from payday loans to
pawn shops, to auto loans and car title loans, many from large national chains—
with little supervision or enforcement.”123
The academic underpinnings of the Bureau also stress the link between financial
distress and fringe banking products. Bar-Gill and Warren’s pivotal article claims
“payday loans can lead to financial distress, bankruptcy, and foreclosure.”124 The
Treasury’s White Paper in support of the Bureau emphasizes the need for
“comprehensive reform” that goes beyond reform to credit cards and mortgages. 125
This reform is needed, the White Paper asserts, to prevent financial crises like the
one the country is currently experiencing.126 Finally, consumer advocates appearing
in support of the Bureau testified that fringe banking causes financial distress.127 In
sum, financial distress has been a centerpiece in the policy rationale articulated to
the public for the Bureau governing fringe banking transactions.
While the Bureau is the most prominent recent example of policy makers using
financial distress to intervene into fringe credit markets, it is not the only example.
On the federal level, legislators supporting payday lending reforms emphasize that
payday lending creates a cycle of debt128 and “traps consumers.”129 Support for a
203, § 1002(5), 1002(15)(A)(xi), 124 Stat. 1956, 1960 (2010) (defining “financial activities”
as “such other financial product or service as may be defined by the Bureau, by regulation,
for purposes of this title”).
121. Remarks, Consumer Financial Protection, supra note 4.
122. Id.
123. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of
the H. Committee on Energy and Commerce, supra note 109, at 4.
124. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 11, at 3.
125. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW
FOUNDATION 55 (2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/wsr/Documents/
FinalReport_web.pdf.
126. Id.
127. See Safeguarding Consumer Protection and the Role of the Federal Reserve:
Hearing on H.R. 3126 Before the Subcomm. on Monetary Policy of the H. Comm. on
Financial Services, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Lauren Saunders, Managing Attorney
of National Consumer Law Center) (“Payday loans are small loans until the next
paycheck. . . . The loans trap borrowers in a cycle of debt. . . . The initial debt of a few
hundred dollars can explode into thousands of dollars of debt they cannot escape.”).
128. 154 CONG. REC. S7969 (daily ed. July 31, 2008) (statement of Sen. Daniel Akaka)
(“Loan flipping often leads to instances where the fees paid for a payday loan well exceed
the principal borrowed. This situation often creates a cycle of debt that is hard to break.”).
129. 155 CONG. REC. E493–94 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2009) (statement of Rep. Luis
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recent bill to reform the Bankruptcy Code came from consumer advocates because
payday loans, among other credit sources, force “borrowers into bankruptcy despite
their best efforts to shave down principal.”130
Financial distress has also been a central concern for state regulators. A report
on short-term lending in Illinois emphasized the expense of fringe banking and
claimed this expense “depletes the customer’s ability to catch-up, therefore making
the customer ‘captive’ to the lender.”131 Tennessee’s statute governing auto title
lenders has a principal reduction feature that requires borrowers make a 5%
principal reduction payment upon the third renewal of their loan.132 This regulation
was specifically motivated by concerns about distress: “principal reduction helps to
prevent such borrowers from being mired into long term debt.”133 As a final
example, Ohio recently passed a payday lending law,134 and the purpose of the
statute was to prevent borrowers from becoming trapped in a cycle of debt.135
This subpart is not intended to criticize either the Bureau or other state or federal
regulations themselves. All of these regulations may be justified and beneficial
market interventions. The point of the subpart is to show that an important
foundation for many of these regulations is a link between financial distress and
fringe banking. The next subpart evaluates that link and concludes it is extremely
difficult to establish. As a result, it turns out regulators have been largely placing
their trust in a faulty rationale.
C. Questioning the Link Between Current Fringe Banking Products and
Financial Distress
The previous two subparts argue that academics and policy makers rely on
financial distress as a significant justification for intervening in fringe credit
markets. As I have noted, this view has intuitive appeal. We might suspect that
people excluded from mainstream credit sources because of poor or nonexistent
credit histories or low incomes would be the most likely to suffer financial distress
because of the fringe credit sources they are forced to use.
Surprisingly, however, the sources of credit in the fringe banking industry are
specifically designed to insulate the borrower from experiencing financial distress.
While it may be unlikely that fringe banking firms are particularly concerned with
the overall financial well-being of their customers, members of the industry have
structured their lending activity to prevent losses due to nonpayment by largely
Gutierrez) (“[A] major concern addressed in this bill relates to the ‘cycle of debt’ that too
often traps consumers when they cannot repay their payday loan when first due. As a result,
many payday lenders force borrowers to rollover their payday loan or obtain a new loan to
pay off the initial loan, while piling on additional fees.”).
130. Stacey Kaper, Battle Lines Form over Rate-Cap Legislation, AM. BANKER, June 1,
2009, at 1, 2.
131. SARAH D. VEGA, ILL. DEP’T OF FIN. INSTS., SHORT TERM LENDING FINAL REPORT 30
(1999).
132. TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-15-113(d) (2005).
133. TENN. DEPT. OF FIN. INSTS., THE 2008 REPORT ON THE TITLE PLEDGE INDUSTRY 18
(2008).
134. H.B. 545, 127th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2007).
135. See Enact a Strong Lending Reform, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, May 5, 2008, at 4B.
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avoiding repayment issues altogether. It is precisely because fringe borrowers are
vulnerable to financial distress that fringe bankers structure transactions to prevent
it.
The following sections survey the different financial products available in the
fringe economy and demonstrate how the fringe banking industry insulates
consumers from financial distress. Because the definition of financial distress is
unclear, I analyze fringe banking in light of the two most prominent definitions of
financial distress, evaluating fringe credit’s propensity to cause people to suffer
from unmanageable debt and its likelihood to cause people to lack the ability to
make ends meet in their financial lives. Regarding unmanageable debt,
demonstrating that there is no link between fringe credit markets and distress is
relatively straightforward because most fringe credit is specifically designed to
prevent unmanageable debt. Evaluating the effect of fringe credit on consumers’
abilities to make ends meet is much more complicated and unsure because it is
difficult to establish with much certainty the secondary effects of fringe
transactions.
Some previous scholarship has contended that some specific fringe products do
not cause borrowers to declare bankruptcy,136 but no other research systematically
surveys the characteristics of all forms of fringe banking products to evaluate the
link between bankruptcy and fringe credit. Furthermore, none of the current
research addresses the broader question of whether fringe banking products cause
financial distress and not just bankruptcy.
1. Rent-to-Own
In rent-to-own transactions, customers obtain possession of goods by making
weekly rental payments. If the customer completes all the rental payments under
the contract, the rent-to-own store gives the customer title to the good. But, if the
customer fails to pay, the only consequence is that the store repossesses the
good.137 The transaction is structured to give customers an easy way out—
consumers do not have any obligation to continue making rental payments under
the rental agreement.138 The consumer does not borrow any money from the rentto-own store and does not make any long term agreements to pay the store
anything.

136. See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 2, at 885–86 (arguing payday lending does not
cause bankruptcy); Todd J. Zywicki, Consumer Welfare and the Regulation of Title Pledge
Lending 41 (George Mason Univ. Mercatus Center, Working Paper No. 09-36, 2009),
available at http://www.mercatus.org/PublicationDetails.aspx?id=28158 (arguing that auto
title loans are relatively unlikely to be fatal to consumer’s balance sheet because of “the
relatively small dollar amounts at stake and inherent limits on the amount of the loan”);
Petru S. Stoianovici, Restrictions on Credit: A Public Policy Analysis of Payday Lending 1
(Aug. 2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Clemson University) (on file with author)
(finding no empirical evidence that payday lending increases the number of people filing for
bankruptcy).
137. Hawkins, supra note 10, at 2047–48.
138. See The Rent to Own Industry: An Overview, ASS’N OF PROGRESSIVE RENTAL ORGS.,
http://www.rtohq.org/apro-rto-industry-overview.html.
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This ability to get out of the arrangement is the structural component of the
transaction that makes it very difficult to establish a link between renting-to-own
and financial distress if financial distress means suffering under unmanageable
debt. Rent-to-own customers are never in a position where they are unable to pay
their debts or service their monthly debt payments because they do not take on any
debt obligations.
To say that rent-to-own transactions are structured to avoid debt is not to say
they are without costs to consumers. Thus, even though the rent-to-own transaction
itself does not involve unmanageable debt, it could cause consumers to take out
unmanageable debt or it could inhibit families’ abilities to make ends meet as a
secondary effect of the transaction. The obvious downside to renting-to-own is that
consumers do not acquire title to the good until completing all the payments on the
contract, so consumers risk losing the equity they have acquired in the goods if they
stop making payments.139 Also, even if they do end up owning the goods, they have
paid substantially more for the goods than if they had bought them outright.140 It is
possible that these costs could cause consumers to default on other credit
obligations141 or take on additional debt to make sure they can make their rental
payments. Also, it is possible that paying high fees for rent-to-own would prevent
consumers from being able to pay for other services they want or need142or from
accumulating savings needed to deal with financial shocks in the future.143 Any of
these scenarios could establish a link to financial distress, depending on what
definition one accepts.
But I do not think these concerns provide evidence that renting-to-own causes
financial distress even as a secondary effect of the transaction. First, the best
empirical evidence indicates rent-to-own customers do not lose equity that they
have built up through numerous rental payments because the largest rent-to-own
stores allow customers to pick up where they left off in rental contracts even after

139. Hawkins, supra note 10, at 2057.
140. Michael Hudson, Just a Few Bucks a Week: The Rent-to-Own Industry, in
MERCHANTS OF MISERY: HOW CORPORATE AMERICA PROFITS FROM POVERTY 145, 145
(Michael Hudson ed., 1996).
141. Cf. Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal: Undue
Hardship Discharge Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 179, 193 (2009) (“[I]t could very well
be that some nondefaulting student-loan debtors suffer financial distress but do not default
because they prioritize repayment of their student loans over other debts.”).
142. See Betti et al., supra note 40, at 140–41 (“[O]ver-indebtedness can arise: the
consumer’s current assets are no longer sufficient to offset the present value of future debts.
In such a situation, the predetermined optimal consumption path is no longer sustainable and
the consumer would be forced onto a lower consumption path that could mean a severe
disruption to the pre-established standard of living.”); Mann & Mann, supra note 37, at 33
(“The relatively limited debt burdens characteristic of younger households suggest not
frugality, but a market constraint that lingers even after decades of market and product
expansion. When younger households experience financial difficulty, often the main sources
of funding to which they can turn are high-cost options that might be as likely to exacerbate
financial distress as they are to help the family through the hard times.”).
143. MANNING, supra note 91, at 217 (“Those who beat the odds rarely accumulate much
equity for future emergency loans—even when they pay off the ownership lease.”).
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stopping payment on the contract for some time.144 Second, although it is possible
that the high costs of rent-to-own cause consumers to default on other debts, there
is no evidence of this effect. It is certainly true that the effects of high costs are
more severe on people with lower incomes, but this argument more aptly criticizes
the pricing of fringe credit than provides evidence of distress. Thus, even when
looking at the secondary effects of renting-to-own, little evidence links rent-to-own
and financial distress.
2. Pawnbroking and Auto Title Lending
Unlike rent-to-own transactions, pawnbroking and title lending do explicitly
involve consumers taking on debt. In both transactions, the lender makes a loan to
customers, and the customers are obligated by the loan agreement to pay back the
loan with interest. Lenders are subject to the Truth-in-Lending Act,145 and the loans
generally operate like any other consumer credit. Two important characteristics set
pawn and auto title loans apart from other sources of credit—the amounts of the
loans are usually quite small and customers have an escape hatch if they cannot pay
off the loan. These two characteristics cast serious doubt on the assertion that
pawnbroking and auto title lending cause financial distress.
First, in pawn transactions, the customer gives the pawnshop some form of
personal property that the pawnshop holds as collateral for the loan given to the
customer.146 Unlike many collateralized transactions, the pawnbroker actually takes
possession of the collateral.147 If the customer cannot pay off the loan after a period
specified by the state statute, the pawnbroker has the right to sell the pawned
good.148 If the sale does not generate sufficient funds to pay off the loan, the
customer is not liable for any deficiency. Alternatively, if the lender recovers more
than the loan from the sale, the customer is not entitled to any surplus.149
Most collateralized loans do not prevent financial distress because they are
recourse loans. Borrowers are liable for the full amount of the loan and must pay
that amount if the sale of the collateral does not cover the debt. John Mixon
explains how recourse debts work in the context of mortgages and how they can
result in financial distress:
Recourse promissory notes impose personal liability on borrowers for
the total amount borrowed. The mortgage pledges the land (for present
purposes, a personal residence) as security. If the borrower defaults, the
lender can foreclose, have the land sold, and apply the proceeds to
reduce the debt. But the note obliges the borrower to repay the
borrowed amount in full and he or she is personally liable for
deficiency if foreclosure sale proceeds do not satisfy the debt. The

144. See Hawkins, supra note 10, at 2084.
145. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–67f (2006).
146. See CASKEY, supra note 83, at 37; Jarret C. Oeltjen, Florida Pawnbroking: An
Industry in Transition, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 995, 1007 (1996).
147. CASKEY, supra note 83, at 68.
148. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 537.008(2)(c)(1) (2009).
149. Oeltjen, supra note 146, at 1006.
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deficiency can be reduced to judgment and recorded in county records,
where it hovers over the debtor for ten or more years. The judgment has
the practical effect of disabling the debtor from participating in the
normal credit market, authorizing seizure and sale of all non-exempt
assets, and, where allowed, subjecting wages to garnishment.150
When a person gets upside down in a loan—when the loan amount is higher
than the worth of the goods—the consequences can be serious, and the loan can
cause the debtor to declare bankruptcy.
Pawn transactions, however, are different than the standard collateralized loan
because they are nonrecourse loans.151 If pawn customers do not have the money to
pay off the loan, they do not have to pay. They can just walk away and not worry
about if the sale will cover the debt. Even those very critical of fringe banking
recognize the benefit of this structure: “One positive feature of pawn credit is its
tendency to be naturally short-term and terminal. Unlike payday loans where
consumers often are forced to repay their loans over relatively long periods, a
defaulting pawn debtor simply forfeits the personal item left with the pawnbroker
as collateral.”152 Thus, for those who associate financial distress with having
unmanageable debt, pawnbroking by definition can never directly cause financial
distress because the debt is self-liquidating.153
The secondary effects of pawn loans are less determinate. The obvious problem
with pawn loans is that people who pawn goods lose out on any equity they own in
the goods beyond the amount of the loan. By law, pawn borrowers are not entitled

150. John Mixon, Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Home Mortgage Documents Interpreted as
Nonrecourse Debt (With Poetic Comments Lifted from Carl Sandburg), 45 CAL. W. L. REV.
35, 35–36 (2008) (footnotes omitted). Mixon expands on the significance of deficiencies:
The matter of deficiencies after foreclosure is important. A congressional report
estimates that subprime mortgages alone will generate two million foreclosures.
House values in some parts of the United States have dropped dramatically, and
many distressed owners find it virtually impossible to sell at prices anywhere
near their mortgage debt. If two million foreclosures produce an average of
twenty thousand dollars deficiency each, the lingering liability could total forty
billion dollars. Even if actual judgments or collection efforts reach only onetenth of that amount, four billion dollars is still a big hit on that part of society
that has just been through financial disaster and is least able to pay. Moreover,
the liability is formal, but not real. The borrowers will not pay because they
have few, if any, assets to attach in satisfaction of the judgment. The only
recovery in most cases will be the pittance professional bill collectors extract.
Id. at 38 (footnotes omitted).
151. Id. at 36 (“Nonrecourse obligations . . . impose no personal liability for deficiency
after foreclosure except claims for waste and foreclosure costs.”).
152. PETERSON, supra note 87, at 20.
153. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Racial Dimensions of Credit and Bankruptcy, 61 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1695, 1702 (2004) (“Blacks who relied on pawnshops and check-cashing
outlets—or more ominously, on loan sharks—had at least some access to credit, but they too
were very unlikely to find themselves in bankruptcy even if they failed to repay what they
had borrowed. . . . Pawnshop loans are essentially self-liquidating because the pawnshop
simply keeps the collateral—whatever it is that the borrower has hocked—if the borrower
fails to repay on time.”).
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to any surplus the sale of their possessions generates.154 Pawn customers are almost
never upside down in pawn transactions because pawnshops typically only lend
around 50% of the value of pawned good.155 As a result, consumers who do not pay
off loans lose wealth because they do not receive the amount they paid for the good
or even the current value of the good.156 Perhaps more significantly, they lose the
ability to use the collateral in the future to obtain other loans when they need them.
For some people, the equity they have in their possession functions as their savings
account, and the loss of that equity means they will be unable to obtain credit.
Still, consumers pawning goods usually do not experience serious financial loss
by losing the good because the value of most pawned goods is small.157 The real
loss to consumers is the lost idiosyncratic value the consumer places on the
goods.158 People who lose their grandmother’s wedding ring from not paying off a
pawn loan experience a personal tragedy, but the consequences are not financial
and are mostly internalized.
Some pawn transactions involve people pawning the tools required for their
livelihood, and losing these tools could render the consumer unemployable, causing
financial distress. But, the vast majority of pawned collateral is not tools,159 so this
concern has limited practical importance. Also, most people redeem their pawns,

154. Oeltjen, supra note 146, at 1006.
155. Id. at 1005. For evidence from the industry, see EZCORP, INC., ANNUAL REPORT
PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(D) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at 4 (2009)
(“We generally lend from 25% to 65% of the pledged property’s estimated resale value
depending on an evaluation of these factors.”).
156. In part, pawn borrowers lose wealth because they paid much more for the goods
than they get through the loan. See KARGER, supra note 6, at 67 (“Appraisals are low—
jewelry appraises at whole value, guns at 60% of blue book value, and appliances at 10%–
30% or less of their original cost.”).
157. Caskey states that the average pawnshop loan was for around $60 in 1991, which
translates to around $93 in 2008 dollars. CASKEY, supra note 83, at 26. Assuming the
amount loaned is around half the value of the goods, on average, people lose less than $100
when they do not pay off pawn loans. See also EZCORP, INC., supra note 155, at 4 (“The
pawn loan amount varies depending on the valuation of the item pawned, but our average
U.S. pawn loan amount typically ranges between $80 and $120.”); ROBERT W. JOHNSON &
DIXIE P. JOHNSON, CREDIT RESEARCH CTR., PAWNBROKING IN THE U.S.: A PROFILE OF
CUSTOMERS 16 (1998) (reporting the average pawn loan in 1997 was approximately $70).
158. Ronald J. Mann, Verification Institutions in Financing Transactions, 87 GEO. L.J.
2225, 2243–44 (1999).
159. EZCORP, INC., supra note 155, at 4 (“Collateral for our pawn loans consists of
tangible personal property, generally jewelry, consumer electronics, tools, sporting goods
and musical instruments. Approximately 65% of our pawn loan collateral is jewelry, and the
vast majority of that is gold jewelry.”); JOHNSON & JOHNSON, supra note 157, at 16
(reporting survey results that people pawn jewelry most frequently, followed by electronic
equipment, guns, hunting equipment, and, fifth, tools); Patricia Older, People Turn to
Pawnshops to Make Ends Meet, PICAYUNE ITEM (Miss.), Dec. 1, 2009, available at
http://picayuneitem.com/local/x546309603/People-turn-to-pawn-shops-to-make-ends-meet
(“[N]owadays [a local pawnshop] sees mostly firearms, music equipment, and gold.”); Karen
Underwood, Staying Afloat: More People Turn to Pawn Shops for Quick Buck as Economy
Sours, HIGH POINT ENTER. (N.C.), Nov. 17, 2008 (reporting that “[g]old, silver, diamonds
and coins are hot sellers” at a local pawn shop).
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further reducing the number of consumers who pawn and lose something required
for their livelihood.160
Pawn transactions have some positive secondary effects as well. For instance,
pawn loans often prevent financial distress by converting the value of a good into
cash which can be used to pay for necessities and to make ends meet.161 Pawnshops
provide essential access to credit for people experiencing financial shocks who may
have nowhere else to turn.162 This access is arguably more important than income
in avoiding hardship.163 Surprisingly, in European countries with restricted access
to credit, people are more likely to be overindebted than in countries with more
access because liquidity constraints prevent consumers from efficiently smoothing
their consumption.164
Another secondary effect of the nature of pawnbroking is that people are
unlikely to flippantly incur substantial amounts of debt. If someone is pawning an
item of personal importance, they are more likely to understand the gravity of their
actions than when they are just swiping their credit card.165 The physical act of
taking property to the pawnshop can itself be quite difficult,166 and borrowers lose
possession of their goods immediately,167 so borrowers experience immediate pain

160. See John P. Caskey, Pawnbroking in America: The Economics of a Forgotten Credit
Market, 23 J. MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 85, 90 tbl.1 (1991) (reporting default rates on
pawn loans from 13.9–30.2% depending on the state); EZCORP, INC., supra note 155, at 4
(“Through our lending guidelines, we maintain an annual redemption rate (the percentage of
loans made that are repaid, renewed or extended) between 76% and 79%.”).
161. See Oeltjen, supra note 146, at 1008 (“Pawnbrokers state that their customers feel
compelled to tell them why they are pawning their possessions and that, instead of
borrowing to finance luxuries such as vacations, ‘[t]hey’re borrowing $500 for food on the
table’ or ‘to satisfy an unexpected need, pay bills or buy groceries.’ Another pawnbroker
commented, ‘We have a lot of people come in here with sick kids and they need a
prescription or food or Pampers, and where are they going to get it?’” (alteration in
original)).
162. Betti et al., supra note 40, at 145 (“Households with low and/or uncertain incomes
often have limited access to credit or rapidly exhaust the credit that they have. Households in
this situation are particularly vulnerable to negative shocks.”).
163. CASKEY, supra note 83, at 121 & n.8.
164. See Betti et al., supra note 40, at 153 (“There is clear evidence to support the
existence of a liquidity constraint, particularly in European countries where consumers have
less access to credit market [sic]. In these countries, over-indebtedness seemed to be severer
and more widespread than in countries with accessible consumer credit markets.”). On the
importance of debt as a way to smooth consumption, see Richard A. Posner, Have We Lost
the Moral Values That Undergird a Commercial Society?, BECKER-POSNER BLOG (June 15,
2008),
http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2008/06/have-we-lost-the-moral-values-thatundergird-a-commercial-society--posner.html (“At the same time, now that we have efficient
debt instruments that in former times did not exist or were extremely costly, the role of
personal debt . . . in human welfare is more apparent than it was. Apart from its role in
solving short-term liquidity problems resulting from delay in the receipt of income, debt
enables consumption to be smoothed over the life cycle.”).
165. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
166. See CASKEY, supra note 83, at 112 (arguing that consumers’ costs in transporting
collateral give pawnshops a local monopoly power).
167. See supra text accompanying note 147.
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in taking out pawn loans. This pain should prevent consumers from thoughtlessly
accumulating debt. Additionally, because the size of pawn loans is set at around
half the value of the collateral, borrowers cannot take on significant amounts of
debt because the value of the collateral constrains them. Thus, while there is a risk
that pawning tools will land some people in financial distress, other characteristics
of pawnbroking suggest that the transaction prevents, not engenders, financial
distress.
Auto title lending is similar to pawnbroking in that consumers obtain loans by
using their cars as collateral. Title lending customers borrow money usually for
thirty days at a time, and title lenders take title of their cars as collateral but allow
the customer to continue to possess the vehicle.168 Like pawn loans, most title loans
are nonrecourse.169 Thus, like in pawn transactions, consumers have a safety hatch
they can use if they cannot pay off the loan—they can walk away with the money
and lose their vehicle. Thus, assuming financial distress means an inability to pay
one’s debts, the title loan borrower literally cannot fall into this category because of
the auto title loan.
Like pawn loans, however, title loans are typically oversecured,170 so people
walking away without their vehicle lose the surplus that could be generated from
the sale of the vehicle. Additionally, consumers are not compensated for the
payments they have already made on the loan if the vehicle is sold, representing a
further loss of money.171 These losses could in turn result in people taking on
unmanageable debts or failing to make ends meet. And, unlike pawn loans, the
stakes are higher with title lending both because the loan amounts are typically
higher172 and because customers could lose a method of transportation to their jobs
if they fail to pay and the lender repossesses their car.
Despite the fact consumers lose their car and larger amounts of the equity in the
vehicle, existing evidence does not link title lending to financial distress. The vast
majority of title loans do not default and result in the lender repossessing the
vehicle.173 So, the actual number of people who lose access to a vehicle and their

168. Zywicki, supra note 136, at 11–12.
169. See ALA. CODE § 5-19A-6 (2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5 § 2260 (2010); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 31-1-816(2)(i) (2010); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-3-413(5) (2009).
170. JEAN ANN FOX & ELIZABETH GUY, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., DRIVEN INTO DEBT:
CFA CAR TITLE LOAN STORE AND ONLINE SURVEY 2 (2005), available at
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Car_Title_Loan_Report_111705.pdf (noting the “most
frequent loan-to-value set at 50 to 55 percent of the car’s value”). Some title lenders appraise
the car at the lowest possible value (the wholesale price in bad condition) and then offer 50%
or 33% of that value. KARGER, supra note 6, at 167.
171. KARGER, supra note 6, at 167.
172. Zywicki, supra note 136, at 11.
173. See id. at 12 (reporting that lenders indicated 8% of loans result in repossession).
See also Annesley H. DeGaris, Car Title Lending, 2 AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR JUSTICE:
AAJ ANNUAL CONVENTION REFERENCE MATERIALS (July 2007) (reporting 10% of title loans
result in repossession). Determining exactly what percent of borrowers have cars repossessed
is difficult, as both Zywicki and DeGaris report repossessions per loan, not per customer,
and customers often rollover each loan multiple times. What percentage of borrowers
experience repossession is an important piece of information missing from current
scholarship on title lending.
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equity in the vehicle because of title lending is low. Also, the loan amounts are still
relatively small. The American Association of Responsible Auto Lenders reports
that the average loan size for its members is $700.174 A study by the Consumer
Federation of America similarly found that “[t]ypical car title loans are for
relatively small amounts, with the median minimum loan $175 and the median
maximum loan $2,500.”175 Thus, assuming the loan-to-value ratio is close to 50%,
the typical loss for consumers is $700 in equity in the car, assuming the title lender
does not give any surplus of the sale of the vehicle to the borrower. $700 is a
significant loss to someone without substantial savings or earning capacity relative
to their wealth, making it difficult to estimate the real effects of these defaults. But,
without evidence about the number of borrowers losing their vehicles, the number
of customers with alternative means of transportation, and the significance and
extent of lost equity, there simply is not evidence that demonstrates title lending
causes distress.
Because lenders are generally limited to selling the collateral as the sole
recourse against the borrower in pawn and title-lending transactions, the link
between financial distress as unmanageable debt and these transactions is
impossible to establish. Even applying a broader definition of distress as inability to
make ends meet and looking at the secondary effects of these transactions, the link
to distress is still far from clear. Like rent-to-own, the lenders have structured the
transaction to prevent the total financial breakdown of the people who use them.
3. Secured Credit Cards
Secured credit cards operate like normal credit cards except the borrower
deposits funds with the lender that serve as the collateral for the credit card.176 The
credit limit for the card is usually set at the same amount of money that the
borrower has placed in a restricted account with the lender.177 Around half of credit
unions offer secured cards,178 as well as many banks.179 In a survey of lowerincome Americans, John Caskey found that 18% of households carried secured
credit cards.180 Banks market these cards to people with poor credit histories or
sporadic employment records, promoting the fact that positive credit information
will be reported to credit bureaus.181

174. Zywicki, supra note 136, at 11.
175. FOX & GUY, supra note 170, at 11.
176. Julie L. Williams, Michael S. Bylsma, Stephen G. Van Meter & Kathryn D. Ray,
Developments in Credit Card Practices and Related Actions by the OCC to Protect
Consumers, 60 BUS. LAW. 691, 692 (2005).
177. Id.
178. Pat Curry, 10 Questions Before Getting a Secured Credit Card, BANKRATE.COM,
http://www.bankrate.com/finance/credit-cards/10-questions-before-getting-a-secured-creditcard-1.aspx.
179. E.g., U.S. Bank Secured Visa Card, U.S. BANK, http://www.usbank.com/creditcards/secured-card.html.
180. JOHN P. CASKEY, LOWER INCOME AMERICANS, HIGHER COST FINANCIAL SERVICES 13
(1997).
181. E.g., U.S. Bank Secured Visa Card, supra note 179.
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Secured credit cards work like pawn and title-lending transactions to give
customers a way out if they cannot repay the loan to the lender. If the consumer
cannot pay back the loan, the lender simply applies the deposit to the outstanding
debt and returns any surplus to the borrower. It is highly unlikely that a borrower
would experience financial distress because borrowers essentially are using money
they have already saved to secure the debt.182 In fact, some commentary challenges
whether secured credit cards even offer credit.183
In addition to providing an escape hatch, secured credit cards also constrain
borrowing, which prevents the credit from becoming the cause of financial distress.
Normal credit cards have such a strong potential to lead consumers to financial
distress because consumers can qualify for and borrow a large percentage of their
annual salary. With secured cards, however, the credit limit is set by the amount the
borrower deposits with the lender, preventing the borrower from getting a very high
loan or becoming overextended.
4. Payday Loans
The clearest link between a fringe banking product and financial distress is
payday lending. Payday loans are short-term, high-interest loans where the
borrower typically writes a check to the lender for the amount of the loan plus the
interest and post-dates the check to the date of the borrower’s next paycheck,
usually two weeks later.184 Unlike rent-to-own, payday lending is a credit product,
and unlike pawn loans, title loans, and secured credit cards, payday loans do not
have an escape hatch that permits borrowers to exit the transaction if they are
unable to pay off the loan.
Although it is not structured with an automatic escape hatch, payday lending is
similar to other fringe loans because payday lending has a stringent cap on how
much credit consumers can obtain—the consumer’s next paycheck. An individual
lender will not permit a borrower to obtain more than their biweekly salary. Even if
the borrower goes to multiple lenders, it is unlikely they could get a loan for more
than their biweekly salary. Lenders report payday loans to Teletrack, a credit
bureau for fringe credit transactions, and lenders check Teletrack before extending
loans to ensure potential borrowers have not taken out other payday loans.185 As a
result of this cap, most payday loan amounts are low, averaging around $300.186 In
many states, statutes disallow loans over $500, guaranteeing relatively low loan

182. KARGER, supra note 6, at 56, 59.
183. See Angela Littwin, Testing the Substitution Hypothesis: Would Credit Card
Regulations Force Low-Income Borrowers into Less Desirable Lending Alternatives?, 2009
U. ILL. L. REV. 403, 448 n.249 (“There is a product known as a secured credit card, but it
does not actually offer the borrower any credit. The putative borrower must send the issuer a
deposit in the amount of the borrower’s line of ‘credit.’”).
184. Mann & Hawkins, supra note 2, at 857.
185. Johnson, supra note 11, at 61. Some states have databases that licensed lenders can
use to verify if someone has already taken out a payday loan. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 487.2142 (West Supp. 2009).
186. Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Measuring the Individual-Level Effects of
Access to Credit: Evidence from Payday Loans (Sept. 7, 2007) (working paper).
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amounts.187 Thus, payday lending avoids the excessive debt burden that most often
causes unmanageable debt. An inability to pay one’s debts is unlikely because the
borrower never owes very much money relative to their income.
Several researchers have studied the link between payday lending and
bankruptcy, coming to different conclusions.188 Some assertions that payday
lending causes bankruptcy are easy to dismiss because they merely note a
correlation between people having payday loans and people declaring
bankruptcy.189 It is not surprising that people who declare bankruptcy have payday
loans because these loans are often a last resort before filing bankruptcy.190 But, a
mere correlation does not establish that payday loans drove the debtors to
bankruptcy.
In one important analysis, however, Paige Marta Skiba and Jeremy Tobacman
conclude payday loans cause bankruptcy. They report that for “first-time applicants
near the 20th percentile of the credit-score distribution who identify the local
average treatment effect, access to payday loans causes chapter 13 bankruptcy
filings over the next two years to double.”191 Their findings are significant because
others have also begun using the study to claim that payday loans cause people to
file bankruptcy without interrogating the bases for Skiba and Tobacman’s
findings.192

187. The model legislation for many payday lending laws is the Deferred Deposit Loan
Act, which has a $500 cap. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE
LEGISLATION
34,
35
(2002),
available
at
ssl.csg.org/dockets/22cycle/
2002sslvolume/2002sslvol.pdf.
188. Compare Skiba & Tobacman, supra note 99, at 1 (concluding payday lending
causes people to be more likely to declare Chapter 13 bankruptcy), with Donald P. Morgan
& Michael Strain, Payday Holiday: How Households Fare After Payday Credit Bans
(Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y. Staff Reports, No. 309, 2008), available at
www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr309.pdf (finding that the abolition of payday
lending in Georgia and North Carolina increased the number of people declaring Chapter 7
bankruptcy), and Stoianovici, supra note 136, at 1 (finding no empirical evidence of a link
between payday lending and increased bankruptcy filings).
189. See, e.g., Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer Financial
Services Marketplace: The Fringe Banking System and Its Challenge to Current Thinking
About the Role of Usury Laws in Today’s Society, 51 S.C. L. REV. 589, 609–10 (2000)
(reporting several sources that claim payday lending causes bankruptcy but that merely note
“the high number of bankruptcies listing fringe lenders as creditors”); Noyes, supra note 96,
at 1645 (claiming “Wisconsin consumer bankruptcy filings establish that bankruptcy
petitioners with payday loans go bankrupt sooner than other debtors,” in part because “about
15% of bankruptcy petitioners listed a payday lender as a creditor”).
190. See Mann & Mann, supra note 37, at 19.
191. Skiba & Tobacman, supra note 99, at 1.
192. See Steven M. Graves & Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Law and the Christian
Right: Faith-Based Political Power and the Geography of American Payday Loan
Regulation, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 637, 646 (2008) (“Payday lending may also tip consumers
teetering on the edge of insolvency into bankruptcy, thereby frustrating the collection efforts
of other creditors who otherwise might have been able to collect.”); Abusive Credit Card
Practices and Bankruptcy: Three ABI Members Testify Before Senate Judiciary
Subcommittee, AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 2009, at 10–11 (“High-interest-rate debt is
financial quicksand. . . . Even small debts at high interest rates can increase the chance of a
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The conclusion that payday lending causes bankruptcy, however, is too blunt.
First of all, Skiba and Tobacman only found that payday loans affect Chapter 13
bankruptcies, not Chapter 7 bankruptcies. They “find no significant effects on
chapter 7 bankruptcies” related to payday lending.193 Thus, when discussing
Chapter 7 bankruptcies, the conclusion is that payday loans do not cause
bankruptcy. Claims based on their work that “a single payday loan of only $300
increases the chance of a bankruptcy filing by 2.84 percent” are simply
inaccurate.194 This is an odd output from their models. If payday lending pushes
people to bankruptcy, why would it only affect Chapter 13 bankruptcies and not
Chapter 7? Skiba and Tobacman offer no reason for the anomalous result.
More importantly for the purposes of this Article, the study does not claim that
payday lending causes financial distress but instead only asserts payday lending
causes people to file for bankruptcy. As explained above, these two concepts are
not identical.195 Skiba and Tobacman find that payday loans constitute a very small
part of consumers’ debt obligations: “Payday loan debt outstanding is therefore a
small fraction of the $34,000 of unsecured debt that these bankruptcy filers had on
average.”196 The consumers who declare bankruptcy after taking out payday loans,
they note, were “already severely financially stressed” before taking out the payday
loan.197 Similarly, other research uses individuals taking out a payday loan as a
proxy for financial distress,198 suggesting that people take out payday loans because
they are experiencing distress and not that payday loans cause distress.
The most significant problem with the study, however, is that there is no
plausible explanation for how payday loans could cause bankruptcy. Skiba and
Tobacman claim the harm of payday lending is that the interest payments on
payday loans might be sufficient “to tip financially stressed payday loan applicants
into bankruptcy.”199 Because payday loans have short durations, they suspect that
“payday interest payments may take priority and borrowers may fall further behind
on other accounts.”200 They estimate that the cumulative interest payments to
payday lenders were 6.5% of the total annual interest burden of consumers
declaring bankruptcy.201 They make this estimation by assuming that the other debt
the consumer held had an annual interest rate of 15%.202
This explanation seems unlikely. Their assumption of a 15% annual interest rate,
for which they do not provide any basis in the paper, is probably wrong. The
bankruptcy filing. A study by Professors Paige Marta Skiba and Jeremy Tobacman found
that a single payday loan of only $300 increases the chance of a bankruptcy filing by 2.84%.
High-interest-rate debt strongly correlates with bankruptcy, which suggests that it
contributes to consumer financial distress and bankruptcy filings.”).
193. Skiba & Tobacman, supra note 99, at 2.
194. Abusive Credit Card Practices and Bankruptcy: Three ABI Members Testify Before
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee, supra note 192, at 10–11 (statement of Adam Levitin).
195. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (noting the important distinction between
the two concepts).
196. Skiba & Tobacman, supra note 99, at 17.
197. Id. at 3.
198. Mann & Mann, supra note 37, at 9–10.
199. Skiba & Tobacman, supra note 99, at 17.
200. Id. at 17.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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Federal Reserve reports that the average annual percentage rate (APR) for all credit
cards in 2009, for example, was between 13.22–14.90%, a figure in line with Skiba
and Tobacman’s assumption.203 Credit card companies, however, charge risky
customers, like those who would be driven to take out a payday loan, significantly
more than other customers.204 Most credit card debt held by individuals with poor
credit is more likely to be at a rate above 20%.205 By using a more realistic
assumption of a 20% APR for consumer non-payday loan debt, cumulative interest
payments due to payday loans only constitute 4.87% of the customers’ overall
cumulative interest payments in Skiba and Tobacman’s study.206 If the average rate
of the other credit is 25%, cumulative interest payments because of payday loans
are only 3.89% of total interest payments. Thus, Skiba and Tobacman’s argument
that payday loans contribute to financial distress because they make up 6.5% of
consumers’ annual interest payment overstates the magnitude of the problem.
John Caskey has pointed out a final problem in Skiba and Tobacman’s paper.
Skiba and Tobacman compare people who were denied for a payday loan with
people who were accepted, and the way the two populations were determined was
by a clear credit score threshold set by the lender who gave Skiba and Tobacman
data. But these two populations are likely “systematically different . . . in both
observable and unobservable ways.”207 The differences are more pronounced if the
two populations compared have different credit scores, and Skiba and Tobacman’s
data only show a statistically significant difference in rates of bankruptcies for
applicants within a 0.5 standard deviation of the credit score threshold and not a
difference for applicants within a 0.01 standard deviation of approval threshold.208
Caskey explains the significance of the different credit scores between the two
populations:
It could be, for example, that applicants with higher credit scores have
more debts with traditional lenders or more assets to protect. If so,
when they face financial difficulties they may be more likely to file for
Chapter 13 bankruptcy, while applicants with lower credit scores
simply ignore their creditors, who also ignore them since there is
almost nothing to gain from someone with few assets, little income, and
a terrible credit history.209
The other two theories in legal literature for why payday loans create financial
distress similarly run into problems creating a plausible causation argument. First,

203. FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE, CONSUMER CREDIT G.19 (July 2009),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/Current/g19.pdf.
204. See MANN, supra note 11, at 190.
205. For instance, Robert Manning suggests 19.8% APR would be a “moderate” APR for
someone with poor credit. MANNING, supra note 91, at 218.
206. I obtained this figure using the calculation Skiba and Tobacman use in their
analysis: $1841*18%/34,000*20%. See Skiba & Tobacman, supra note 99, at 17.
207. John P. Caskey, Payday Lending: New Research and the Big Question 30 (Research
Dep’t Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 10-32, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1696019.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 30–31.
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some commentary argues that payday loans are too expensive for people. The
argument makes sense. The high cost of the credit causes distress because people
are spending money servicing their loan instead of using the money to make ends
meet: “For such debtors, payday loans may become a trap they cannot escape
without missing rent, utilities, car payments, or food expenditures. These loans can
create a biweekly cycle of income and expenses leaving only enough surplus
income to pay the most recent accrual of interest and fees.”210 As discussed above,
this argument proves too much. It would allow people to establish links between
financial distress and any expensive product or service. More importantly, this
argument is overstated. If borrowers are rolling over a payday loan for $300, it
means every paycheck the borrower is paying $45 on average in interest. It is
highly unlikely that a $45 payment every other week will substantially exacerbate
significant financial distress, although, admittedly, it will cost the borrower a lot of
money.
The final theory of how payday lending causes financial distress is that
borrowers roll loans over and over, creating a long-term debt obligation. Even with
the reality of rollovers, which are a significant problem, two facts make it unlikely
that rollovers alone cause serious financial distress. First, even if a consumer rolls
over a payday loan, the total amount of the indebtedness is capped at the amount of
the loan.211 So, it is impossible for the consumer’s debt to spiral out of control:
“Even in the most dramatic examples—in which a customer pays $1000 to
maintain a $150 debt over a period of eighteen months—the customer’s level of
debt never increases beyond $150.”212 Second, most payday loan obligations are
not rolled over for substantially long terms. The most damning evidence of the
frequency of rollovers suggests that the average borrower takes out 12.5 payday
loans a year.213 Half a year may be a long time to have a loan designed to be two
weeks long, but when compared to other forms of debt, it is relatively short term.
Also, other survey data suggest that most people who use payday loans do so once
or twice a year.214
In the end, payday loans operate just like other fringe banking products. They
are structured, like the other forms of credit, to prevent borrowers from suffering
financial distress because they do not allow borrowers to take on large amounts of
debt. This cap on debt limits the likelihood that a payday loan will cause the
borrower to incur unmanageable debt or be unable to make ends meet. For each of
the forms of credit discussed here, the link between the credit and financial distress
is either nonexistent or tenuous. Policy makers and academics cannot rely on
financial distress as a basis to justify intervention into these markets as the products

210. PETERSON, supra note 87, at 14.
211. Mann & Hawkins, supra note 2, at 896.
212. Id.
213. See Steven M. Graves & Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Lending and the
Military: The Law and Geography of “Payday” Loans in Military Towns, 66 OHIO ST. L.J.
653, 663 (2005) (collecting studies showing the frequency of rollovers; the one with the
largest number of rollovers is presented here).
214. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF
UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS 31 (2009) (reporting that 58.3% of unbanked
people who stated they had used a payday loan reported using it once or twice a year).
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currently exist. The next subpart extends this argument by contending that any
innovations in fringe credit products will likely share similar characteristics to
current products, undermining the link to financial distress.
D. Structural Components of the Fringe Economy that Make Links to Financial
Distress Unlikely in the Future
Some critics of fringe bankers claim that there are no limits on what fringe
credit providers will do to make money. Firms will create any product, the
reasoning goes, that is passably legal.215 This subpart argues that in addition to
legal constraints, there are significant structural constraints in fringe credit markets
that limit the sorts of transactions fringe providers can create and that these
constraints produce specific characteristics of fringe credit products. Constraints
stem from the fact that lenders do not trust financially marginalized people to repay
their loans. Because fringe lenders are unwilling to take on the risk of nonpayment,
they must structure the transaction to have the total amount of debt be low, and the
amount of the debt must be tied to a tangible source of repayment, either collateral
or an upcoming paycheck. Any innovative products in fringe credit markets will of
necessity have these characteristics and thus will be unlikely to cause financial
distress. Indeed, the very fact that alternatives to fringe banking have not arisen216
is some evidence that structural constraints in these markets dictate the nature of
the transactions.
Characteristics of fringe credit products obverse each of the characteristics of
credit cards that link credit card debt to financial distress.217 While credit card
limits are set at very high levels and allow debt to spiral out of control, the amount
of debt incurred through fringe credit products is significantly constrained. Credit
cards make incurring debt easy because they are revolving debt, but incurring debt
is more difficult in fringe credit markets because fringe credit is nonrevolving debt.
Finally, people incur debt up to the unrealistic limits credit card companies set for
consumers, but consumers using fringe credit products have realistic debt
obligations. The opposing characteristics of mainstream credit card debt and fringe
credit products demonstrate how the latter are unlikely to engender financial
distress now or in the future.
The most significant characteristic of fringe credit products is that the amount of
the debt is constrained. Simply put, fringe creditors will not lend significant
amounts of money to borrowers because they do not trust that borrowers will pay
them back.218 In other credit markets, creditors lend based on the borrower’s

215. KARGER, supra note 6, at 4 (“These fringe economy services are equivalent to an
economic Wild West where just about any financial scheme that’s not patently illegal is
tolerated.”).
216. Id. at 104 (“Although the fringe economy saps the income and assets of poor
families and communities, no simple or effective alternative to fringe lending has arisen that
doesn’t harm low-income people.”).
217. See supra Part I.C.
218. See KARGER, supra note 6, at 42 (“Neither trust nor the presumption of goodwill
exists in the fringe economy . . . .”).
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creditworthiness as predicted by credit scores.219 In the fringe economy, however,
lenders explicitly advertise that they perform “no credit checks,” and for the most
part, they do not use any technology to judge borrowers’ creditworthiness.220
Lenders assume borrowers will not reliably pay back their debts, so they structure
the transactions to ensure repayment through other means.221 Unless in the future
fringe lenders are suddenly inclined to take on substantial risk, this characteristic is
unlikely to change.
One common structure secures repayment through collateral. This is a likely
avenue for new fringe credit products as well because it ensures the lender will be
able to recover the debt without relying on the borrower for repayment. Payday
loans operate without collateral but still are constrained by the amount of the
borrower’s next paycheck. While credit card companies issue credit limits that are
around one-fifth of a borrower’s annual income, payday lenders restrict loan totals
to one-twenty-sixth of the consumer’s annual income. Payday lenders do rely in
some part on the borrower’s creditworthiness because they check Teletrack to
determine if the borrower has taken out or defaulted on previous payday loans.222
As noted in Part II.C.4, the most plausible link between a fringe banking product
and financial distress is payday lending. Ironically, the more lenders depend on
creditworthiness to extend credit, the greater the likelihood the transaction will
cause financial distress. The better someone’s credit history when they enter a
credit transaction, the higher the risk they face that the transaction will cause them
to experience distress. Figure 1 is a pictorial representation of this observation.

219. See id. (observing that loans to the middle class are “secured by the borrower’s
creditworthiness”).
220. See MARRON, supra note 19, at 142 (“In practice, [fringe creditors] do not deploy
technologies of credit scoring constituting individuals as risks nor feature as junctures within
a national credit reporting assemblage which derive and calibrate the consumer’s capacity to
self-govern.”).
221. See id. at 15 (“[N]ewly ascendant payday lenders, pawnbrokers, and rent to own
retailers offer an ersatz alternative to credit cards and personal loans for the poor and the
marginalized, but in ways that make no pretence that such consumers can or are in a position
to govern themselves. They generate coercive practices redolent of their nineteenth-century
forebears, compelling a regime of repayments . . . .”).
222. KARGER, supra note 6, at 74.
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Figure 1: The Relationship Between Creditworthiness and Distress
Pawnshops, Auto Title Loans, Payday Loans, Mainstream Credit
Cards, and Secured Credit Cards

Lenders’ Reliance on Creditworthiness

Increased Risk the Transaction Will Cause Financial Distress

In terms of financial distress, the effect of constraints is straightforward.
Borrowers cannot accumulate as much debt with fringe products as with other
credit sources, so they cannot become as prone to experience distress. More
significantly, because lenders use means other than credit history to ensure
repayment, borrowers’ debts are usually paid off even if they cannot pay, making it
impossible for them to take on unmanageable debt through fringe credit products.
In addition to the constraints on the amount of debt, any new fringe transaction
is likely to be nonrevolving debt, a second common characteristic of fringe credit.
All current forms of fringe banking are nonrevolving because they all have fixed
balances which cannot be increased without taking out a new loan.223 Any future
fringe products that are collateralized will be nonrevolving because in order to
increase the loan amount, the consumer has to bring in new collateral. Even
possible fringe products based on future income are likely to be nonrevolving
because lenders have a strong interest in verifying the amount of future income.
Some statutes even require that extensions of fringe loans be made in a separate
agreement.224 So, if a borrower wants a higher debt amount, a lender is likely to
require the borrower to separately apply to prove the income is forthcoming.
Because fringe credit is inevitably nonrevolving, consumers are much less likely to
thoughtlessly incur significant amounts of debt. Experiencing this immediate pain
discourages consumers from taking on debt, limiting their exposure to distress.
Finally, unlike credit cards, borrowers in fringe markets are not driven to
accumulate debt by lenders setting unrealistic credit limits and borrowers following
their lenders’ leads. Fringe creditors set loan amounts either based on the value of
the collateral or the borrower’s next paycheck. Both of these amounts are realistic
for the borrower to pay off. Thus, because the loan amounts are realistic for the
borrower to repay, borrowers in the fringe economy are not prone to use their
lenders’ assessment on their credit limits as proxies for how much debt they should

223. See id. at 42.
224. For instance, Florida’s title loan statute states: “A title loan agreement may be
extended for one or more 30-day periods by mutual consent of the title loan lender and the
borrower. Each extension of a title loan agreement shall be executed in a separate extension
agreement . . . .” FLA. STAT. § 537.011(3) (2009).
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accumulate. Unless fringe creditors become willing to take on substantially more
risk in the future, it is unlikely that borrowers will have much higher credit limits.
III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The conclusion that fringe banking does not lead to financial distress will
surprise many academics and policy makers who have relied on this rationale to
justify fringe banking regulation. This Part charts out the implications of reaching
this conclusion and hopes to reshape the academic and policy debates about fringe
banking regulation.
A. Revealing and Rejecting a Faulty Heuristic
The most significant policy implication of this Article’s claim is also the most
obvious: Policy makers should stop justifying fringe banking regulations because
of a supposed link between fringe banking and financial distress. Policy makers
have employed a faulty heuristic when considering the effect of fringe credit
products by lumping fringe credit transactions together with other credit products
like credit cards and mortgages and assuming that all credit products have the
potential to cause financial distress. This faulty heuristic, in turn, leads to
misguided and overly broad fringe banking regulations.
Behavioral economists have offered significant evidence against the rational
actor model of consumer decision making, positing that consumers making choices
about products operate with bounded rationality. Consumers overestimate the
likelihood of some events occurring225 while underestimating the likelihood of
others;226 they are overly optimistic about their futures;227 they lack defined, stable
preferences;228 and they use faulty heuristics or shortcuts in reasoning.229
Just as cognitive limitations affect consumers, they also affect legislators.230
Indeed, some have argued that cognitive biases have a greater effect on public

225. Patricia A. McCoy, A Behavioral Analysis of Predatory Lending, 38 AKRON L. REV.
725, 736 (2005) (reporting studies that found that “people tend to overestimate the
probability of compound events”).
226. Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1400 (2004) (noting
that people underestimate the likelihood they will incur substantial debt on their credit
cards).
227. Id.
228. Colin Camerer, Samuel Issacharoff, George Loewenstein, Ted O’Donoghue &
Matthew Rabin, Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for
“Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1214–15 (2003).
229. See Adrian Vermeule, Emergency Lawmaking After 9/11 and 7/7, 75 U. CHI. L. REV.
1155, 1179 (2008) (“To cope with bounded information and rationality, it is common to
adopt simple heuristics, or decisionmaking maxims. Such heuristics can misfire in
systematic ways . . . .”).
230. See KURT WEYLAND, LEARNING FROM FOREIGN MODELS IN LATIN AMERICA POLICY
REFORM 278 (2004) (arguing policy makers adopting market reforms are affected by
availability heuristics, representativeness heuristics, and anchoring heuristics); Stephen J.
Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 20–36
(2003) (discussing how the SEC is affected by behavioral limitations); Frank B. Cross &
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decision making than private decision making.231 One specific bias that research
has identified in the context of policy making is the availability bias.232 If a
consequence is memorable, vivid, and easily retrievable, policy makers are apt to
overestimate the likelihood that consequence will occur.
In the consumer credit context, policy makers are likely to overestimate the
probability that any single credit product is going to lead to financial distress
because financial distress is a vivid consequence of unmanageable debt.
Academics’ and legislators’ tendencies to equate fringe credit products with
financial distress is not surprising given the publicity afforded the role of consumer
credit in the current economic downturn.233 The media’s extensive coverage of the
links between subprime mortgages and current economic malaise makes financial
distress “more retrievable, imaginable, compelling, or memorable” to policy
makers considering credit regulations.234
As this Article demonstrates, this heuristic is faulty. Some shortcuts in reasoning
are necessary because people have to live life without doing an exhaustive analysis
of every decision.235 But, if a heuristic is misleading, policy makers must reject it
because a faulty heuristic results in bad policies.236 Regulators and academics need
to stop conflating fringe banking and credit cards and instead look to the specific
characteristics of different consumer credit products.
Rejecting this heuristic will affect policy debates in two ways, discussed in the
next two sections. First, it will make other justifications for regulation more
prominent. Most significantly, in the absence of externalities, paternalism should
Robert A. Prentice, The Economic Value of Securities Regulation, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 333,
367 (2006) (“Government officers, like private informational intermediaries and others, are
subject to self interest and heuristics that may lead them to make unwise decisions.”); Cass
R. Sunstein, On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate Change, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 503, 537 n.188 (2007) (“Even if many heuristics mostly work well in daily
life, a sensible government can do much better than to rely on them.”). Mario Rizzo and
Glen Whitman have provided an extended argument for how behavioral constraints
undermine the ability of legislators to pass effective regulations. See generally Mario J.
Rizzo & Douglas Glen Whitman, Little Brother Is Watching You: New Paternalism on the
Slippery Slopes, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 685 (2009); Douglas Glen Whitman & Mario J. Rizzo,
Paternalist Slopes, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 411 (2007).
231. See generally Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.
133 (2006).
232. See supra Part I.C; see also Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the
Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 60–61 (1995) (“‘Availability’ means that people’s
assessment of one risk depends, at times, on how readily similar events come to their minds.
When this effect is at work, people will overestimate the probability that an event will occur
if the occurrence of similar events comes easily to mind . . . .”).
233. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Bottom-Up Versus Top-Down Lawmaking, 73 U. CHI. L.
REV. 933, 958 (2006) (describing “anecdote-driven legislation” which is a response to “a
social problem that becomes so vivid and salient, that it instills an exaggerated sense of
urgency in the public eye”).
234. Rachel R. Jones, Note, Risky Business: Barriers to Rationality in Congress, 36
ECOLOGY L.Q. 467, 482 (2009).
235. See Vermeule, supra note 229, at 1179.
236. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal
Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 572 (2002) (“[G]overnment is apt to make
bad choices when government decisionmakers rely on misleading heuristics . . . .”).
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figure more prominently into debates about fringe markets. Second, it will affect
the sorts of policies policy makers should implement.
B. The Importance of Paternalism
By advancing the claim in this Article, I am not arguing that no justifications
exist for interfering in fringe credit markets. If financial distress cannot be invoked,
researchers supporting regulations will have to focus on other theoretical
justifications for regulating. Paternalism is perhaps the most apt justification for
regulating credit markets that do not exacerbate financial distress because it does
not rely on the existence of externalities.237 Paternalism, especially the libertarian
paternalism that responds to cognitive limits identified by behavioral economics,
aims to protect people from bad decisions, so it can justify regulations even if a
credit transaction has no negative effects on third parties.238
Some of the literature already seeks to justify fringe banking regulation on the
basis of paternalism,239 courts have recognized its significance,240 and critics of the
Bureau have argued that the Bureau is premised on paternalism as a hidden
rationale.241 But, when compared to other credit devices like credit cards,
researchers have spent little effort establishing the arguments for paternalistic
intervention into fringe credit markets.242 If paternalistic concerns over defective
decision making are to replace financial distress, more research needs to be done to
understand how consumers make decisions in the fringe economy. Thus, this

237. See generally Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998).
238. See generally Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not
an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003).
239. See, e.g., Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational
Borrower: Rationality, Behavioralism, and the Misguided “Reform” of the Bankruptcy Law,
84 TEX. L. REV. 1481, 1543 (2006) (suggesting payday lenders capitalize on consumers’
overconfidence they will not have to rollover); Hawkins, supra note 10, at 2050 (arguing for
rent-to-own regulations based on liberation paternalism); Alan M. White, Behavior and
Contract, 27 LAW & INEQ. 135, 159 (2009) (positing that payday lenders use “framing” to
alter “consumer’s preferences by defining the menu from which choices are made”).
240. See Midwest Title Loans, Inc. v. Mills, 593 F.3d 660, 663–65 (7th Cir. 2010).
241. See Posner, supra note 113 (“What is new in the proposed CFPA statute though not
mentioned in it is ‘behavioral economics’ [as a basis for paternalistic intervention].”);
Wright & Zywicki, supra note 112 (“These intellectual architects of the CFPA assert that
irrational consumer behavior is at the heart of the financial crisis, and that the CFPA is
needed to ‘nudge’ consumers toward better decision making in lending markets.”).
242. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Ausubel, Credit Card Defaults, Credit Card Profits, and
Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 249, 264–67 (1997); Lawrence M. Ausubel, The Failure of
Competition in the Credit Card Market, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 50, 73–75 (1991); Bar-Gill,
supra note 226; Tom Brown & Lacey Plache, Paying with Plastic: Maybe Not So Crazy, 73
U. CHI. L. REV. 63, 65–67 (2006); James M. Hunt, Renee A. Florsheim, Anindya Chatterjee
& Jerome B. Kernan, Credit Cards as Spending-Facilitating Stimuli: A Test and Extension
of Feinberg’s Conditioning Hypothesis, 67 PSYCHOL. REP. 323, 329–30 (1990).
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Article joins others in the call for researchers to explore paternalism as a basis for
fringe banking regulations.243
C. Policy Directions
If policy makers reject the notion that fringe banking causes financial distress
and turn to other policy rationales like paternalism, it will shape the sorts of fringe
banking regulations they adopt. This subpart offers a first pass at delineating types
of regulations that appear to respond to fears about financial distress from those
that have other rationales. A comprehensive review of all current and proposed
fringe banking regulations is beyond the scope of this Article, but exploring a few
examples illustrates the way regulators will have to rethink their approach to
regulating credit markets for the poor.
Some regulations appear to be completely separable from financial distress as a
rationale for regulation and instead rely on fairness, paternalism, or similar
justifications that relate to protecting only the parties to the transaction. For
instance, many states have mandatory disclosure requirements that provide
consumers with information about the transaction.244 This information is meant to
protect people from entering into transactions when they are uninformed or
misinformed.245 Other regulations protect people from impulsive decisions, such as
statutes that permit borrowers to rescind loans within a few days of taking them
out.246 The law also protects people it judges to lack the capacity to rationally enter
fringe transactions, like minors.247 Finally, some judicial decisions protect people

243. See John Caskey, Fringe Banking and the Rise of Payday Lending, in CREDIT
MARKETS FOR THE POOR 40 (Patrick Bolton & Howard Rosenthal eds., 2005) (suggesting
that further research to guide regulations is required to determine if payday loan consumers
suffer from cumulative cost neglect and a lack of self-control, two common behavioral
biases used as foundations for paternalistic regulations).
244. See, e.g., Consumer Rental Purchase Agreement Act, H.R. 1767, 110th Cong.
§ 1010(a) (2007) (proposing a federal law that would require rent-to-own stores “(1) A brief
description of the property. (2) Whether the property is new or used. (3) The cash price of
the property. (4) The amount of each rental payment. (5) The total number of rental
payments necessary to acquire ownership of the property. (6) The rental-purchase cost”);
FLA. STAT. § 537.008 (2009) (requiring similar disclosures for title loans); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 539.001(8)(b)(6) (West 2009) (requiring the front of pawn tickets to disclose the amount of
the loan, the annual percentage rate, the maturity date of the pawn, and similar information);
IOWA CODE § 533D.9(2) (2008) (requiring payday lenders give written notice to borrowers
of the fee, the annual percentage rate, and the date the lender will deposit the borrower’s
check).
245. See Cass R. Sunstein, Boundedly Rational Borrowing, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 251
(2006) (“A key question is why people might be excessive rather than optimal borrowers. . . .
[B]orrowers might not be adequately informed of the costs and benefits of borrowing. They
might not read the fine print; they might believe that short-term ‘teaser rates’ are actually
long-term, or at least neglect the fact that such rates will have only a small beneficial effect
on their finances.”).
246. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 487.2151(6) (West Supp. 2009) (permitting
borrowers to rescind payday loans within a day of taking them out).
247. CAL. FIN. CODE § 21207 (2009).
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from waiving important rights.248 To the extent that research can develop
paternalistic rationales for these sorts of regulations, the fact that fringe banking
cannot be linked to financial distress is inconsequential because these regulations
can be justified without reference to externalities created by the transaction.
Other regulations, however, appear to be premised on the belief that fringe
banking products have such severe consequences, such as financial distress, that
they must be heavily regulated. Banning fringe banking transactions249 is the
clearest example of regulations that must rely on severe consequences like financial
distress as a rationale for drastic market intervention. John Pottow has suggested
that “the case for legal intervention is strengthened by the degree to which
externalities pervade.”250 If the legal intervention is more drastic, such as
prohibiting the transaction entirely, the case for that intervention must be stronger.
Price caps can have the same effect as outright bans if the caps make operating
fringe banking firms impossible. Some price caps are high enough that fringe
business can still operate profitably.251 Other states, however, have set price caps
that drive all fringe lenders affected by the cap to leave the state or to engage in
illegal practices. For instance, Oregon restricted payday lenders to charging a 36%
interest rate in 2007.252 Within one year, 75% of the lenders left Oregon.253 After
Ohio imposed a 28% interest rate cap on payday lending, hundreds of payday
lenders left the state completely, and the lenders who stayed created new fees to
obviate the cap.254 While these statutes take the form of price regulations, they
function really as bans on fringe credit.255 The conclusion of this Article should

248. See E-Z Cash Advance, Inc. v. Harris, 60 S.W.3d 436, 442 (Ark. 2001) (holding an
arbitration agreement in a payday lending contract was unenforceable); Muhammad v. Cnty.
Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Delaware, 912 A.2d 88, 100–01 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2006) (voiding a
similar arbitration agreement).
249. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-17-2 (2009) (banning payday lending in Georgia).
250. Pottow, supra note 11, at 412 n.34.
251. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-248(a) (2009) (forbidding “a rent-to-own
agreement in which the total of rental payments necessary to acquire ownership exceeds
twice the cash price of the rented property,” which approximates market prices in other
states); IOWA CODE § 533D.9(1) (2008) (setting pawn prices at prices similar to the market
price in other states: “A licensee shall not charge a fee in excess of fifteen dollars on the first
one hundred dollars on the face amount of a check or more than ten dollars on subsequent
one hundred dollar increments on the face amount of the check for services provided by the
licensee, or pro rata for any portion of one hundred dollars face value.”).
252. See OR. REV. STAT. § 725.622(1) (2007) (“A lender in the business of making
payday loans may not: Make or renew a payday loan at a rate of interest that exceeds 36
percent per annum . . . .”), repealed by Or. Laws Spec. Sess., ch. 23, § 34 (2010)
(maintaining the same 36 percent standard but “excluding a one-time origination fee for a
new loan”).
253. Bill Graves, Oregon’s Payday Lenders All But Gone, OREGONIAN (Portland), July 6,
2008, at A01.
254. Jim Siegel, Fixing Payday-Loan Law Is Legislators’ Job, State Says, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Feb. 20, 2009, at 03B.
255. See Littwin, supra note 10, at 454 n.7 (explaining how usury limits can effectively
restrict credit products).
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force regulators to reconsider these sorts of drastic measures because they cannot
depend on externalities associated with financial distress to justify intervention.
Finally, there are regulations that seem aimed at preventing financial distress as
a secondary effect of fringe credit products. Insofar as the secondary effects of
fringe banking are indeterminate, regulators worried about the consequences of
fringe credit might consider these sorts of regulations. For instance, perhaps in
response to the concern that carpenters will pawn their tools or musicians their
instruments and thus lose their livelihood,256 many pawn regulations require that
the pawnbroker hold property for an extended period of time after the borrower
first takes out the loan.257 Similarly, some title lending statutes require that the
lender hold the vehicle for thirty days after the maturity date of the loan before
repossessing and selling it.258 Some title lending statutes even require the lender to
allow the borrower to redeem the vehicle up until the time of the actual sale.259
These requirements could avert the financial crisis that might result if the lender
repossesses the vehicle quickly after default and the borrower has no way to get to
work.260 In the context of payday lending, some statutes mitigate the distress that
frequent rollovers may cause by allowing borrowers to pay off the principal due on
the loan in installments.261 This Article has argued it is unlikely fringe banking
produces financial distress as a secondary effect, but to the extent this claim is
necessarily tentative, regulators may consider these sorts of policies as a
prophylactic measure to prevent adverse consequences of fringe credit products.
CONCLUSION
To ensure a solid foundation for fringe banking regulations, it is essential that
regulators address the real problems that fringe banking creates. Regulators cannot
craft sensible regulations by importing problems created by other forms of credit
into the fringe banking arena. This Article has documented the significant reliance
academics and policy makers place on the assertion that fringe banking causes
financial distress. This reliance is misplaced, and the result is a substantial amount
of regulation directed at solving a problem that does not exist.
By examining how fringe banking products operate, I demonstrated that current
fringe banking products largely eliminate the potential for borrowers to incur
unmanageable debt. Some do so by ensuring repayment through collateral, and
others constrain the amount of debt a borrower can incur at a reasonable level.
Because fringe creditors will always be concerned about repayment, it is unlikely
any future products in fringe credit markets will extend credit without collateral or
tight limits on the amount of credit.

256. See supra Part II.C.2.
257. See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE § 21201 (2009) (requiring pawnbrokers to hold pawned
good for four months).
258. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 537.008(2)(c)(1) (2009).
259. See id. § 537.012(3).
260. See supra Part II.C.2.
261. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 487.2160(a) (West Supp. 2009) (mandating that
customers who take out eight payday loans in a year be given the option to repay the
principle debt in three installments each due on the borrower’s paydays).
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Future research into fringe banking must look to new rationales for regulation,
and policy makers should avoid faulty heuristics that lump fringe banking with
other distinct forms of credit. Fringe banking regulations are needed to ensure the
well-being of the consumers who borrow in the fringe economy. Implementing
regulations to prevent financial distress, however, are misguided and have the
potential to harm the very consumers they are meant to protect.

